Chapter I Insufficiency of Remedies Currently Advocated

In tracing to its source the cause of increasing poverty amid advancing wealth, we have discovered the remedy; but before passing to that branch of our subject it will be well to review the tendencies or remedies which are currently relied on or advocated. The remedy to which our conclusions point is at once radical and simple—so radical that, on the one side, it will not be fairly considered so long as any faith remains in the efficacy of less caustic measures; so simple that, on the other side, its real efficacy and comprehensiveness are likely to be overlooked, until the effect of more elaborate measures is estimated.

In tracing the cause of increasing poverty amid advancing wealth to its source, we have found the remedy. Before turning to it, though, we should review the tendencies and remedies now relied on or advocated. The remedy our conclusions point to is both radical and simple. It is so radical that people will not consider it fairly while they still have faith in milder measures. It is so simple that its real effectiveness and reach are likely to be overlooked until the effect of more elaborate measures has been weighed.

The tendencies and measures which current literature and discussions show to be more or less relied on or advocated as calculated to relieve poverty and distress among the masses may be divided into six classes. I do not mean that there are so many distinct parties or schools of thought, but merely that, for the purpose of our inquiry, prevailing opinions and proposed measures may be so grouped for review. Remedies which for the sake of greater convenience and clearness we shall consider separately are often combined in thought.

Current writing and discussion show six classes of tendencies and measures that people more or less rely on or advocate to relieve poverty and distress among the masses. I do not mean there are six distinct parties or schools of thought. I mean only that for our inquiry, prevailing opinions and proposed measures can be grouped this way for review. Remedies that I will consider separately, for convenience and clarity, are often combined in people’s minds.

There are many persons who still retain a comfortable belief that material progress will ultimately extirpate poverty, and there are many who look to prudential restraint upon the increase of population as the most efficacious means, but the fallacy of these views has al298ready been sufficiently shown. Let us now consider what may be hoped for:

Many people still comfortably believe that material progress will in the end wipe out poverty, and many look to prudential restraint on the increase of population as the most effective means. The error in these views has already been shown well enough.298 Let us now consider what can be hoped for:

I. From greater economy in government.

I. From greater economy in government.

II. From the better education of the working classes and improved habits of industry and thrift.

II. From better education of the working classes and improved habits of industry and thrift.

III. From combinations of workmen for the advance of wages.

III. From combinations of workmen to advance wages.

IV. From the co-operation of labor and capital.

IV. From the co-operation of labor and capital.

V. From governmental direction and interference.

V. From governmental direction and interference.

VI. From a more general distribution of land.

VI. From a more general distribution of land.

Under these six heads I think we may in essential form review all hopes and propositions for the relief of social distress short of the simple but far-reaching measure which I shall propose.

I think these six heads cover, in essential form, every hope and proposal for relieving social distress, short of the simple but far-reaching measure I shall propose.

Until a very few years ago it was an article of faith with Americans—a belief shared by European liberals—that the poverty of the down-trodden masses of the Old World was due to aristocratic and monarchical institutions. This belief has rapidly passed away with the appearance in the United States, under republican institutions, of social distress of the same kind, if not of the same intensity, as that prevailing in Europe. But social distress is still largely attributed to the immense burdens which existing governments impose—the great debts, the military and naval establishments, the extravagance which is characteristic as well of republican as of monarchical rulers, and especially characteristic of the administration of great cities. To these must be added, in the United States, the robbery involved in the protective tariff, which for every twenty-five cents it puts in the treasury takes a dollar and it may be four or five out of the pocket of the consumer. Now, there seems to be an evident connection between the immense sums thus taken from the people and the privations of the lower299 classes, and it is upon a superficial view natural to suppose that a reduction in the enormous burdens thus uselessly imposed would make it easier for the poorest to get a living. But a consideration of the matter in the light of the economic principles heretofore traced out will show that this would not be the effect. A reduction in the amount taken from the aggregate produce of a community by taxation would be simply equivalent to an increase in the power of net production. It would in effect add to the productive power of labor just as do the increasing density of population and improvement in the arts. And as the advantage in the one case goes, and must go, to the owners of land, in increased rent, so would the advantage in the other.

Until a very few years ago Americans held it as an article of faith, shared by European liberals, that the poverty of the downtrodden masses of the Old World came from aristocratic and monarchical institutions. That belief has passed away quickly, because social distress of the same kind, if not the same intensity, has appeared in the United States under republican institutions. But people still largely blame social distress on the immense burdens that governments impose. They point to the great debts, the military and naval establishments, and the extravagance that marks republican rulers as much as monarchical ones, especially in the administration of great cities. In the United States there is also the robbery of the protective tariff, which for every twenty-five cents it puts in the treasury takes a dollar, and perhaps four or five, out of the consumer’s pocket. There seems to be an obvious connection between the huge sums taken from the people and the privations of the lower classes.299 At first glance it is natural to suppose that reducing these enormous, useless burdens would make it easier for the poorest to get a living. But the economic principles we have traced out show that it would not. A reduction in what taxation takes from a community’s total produce is simply equivalent to an increase in the power of net production. It would add to the productive power of labor in effect just as growing density of population and improvement in the arts do. And as the advantage in that case goes, and must go, to the owners of land in higher rent, so would the advantage in this one.

From the produce of the labor and capital of England are now supported the burden of an immense debt, an Established Church, an expensive royal family, a large number of sinecurists, a great army and great navy. Suppose the debt repudiated, the Church disestablished, the royal family set adrift to make a living for themselves, the sinecurists cut off, the army disbanded, the officers and men of the navy discharged and the ships sold. An enormous reduction in taxation would thus become possible. There would be a great addition to the net produce which remains to be distributed among the parties to production. But it would be only such an addition as improvement in the arts has been for a long time constantly making, and not so great an addition as steam and machinery have made within the last twenty or thirty years. And as these additions have not alleviated pauperism, but have only increased rent, so would this. English land owners would reap the whole benefit. I will not dispute that if all these things could be done suddenly, and without the destruction and expense involved in a revolution, there might be a temporary improvement in the condition of the lowest class; but such300 a sudden and peaceable reform is manifestly impossible. And if it were, any temporary improvement would, by the process we now see going on in the United States, be ultimately swallowed up by increased land values.

The produce of the labor and capital of England now supports an immense debt, an Established Church, an expensive royal family, a large number of sinecurists, a great army and a great navy. Suppose the debt were repudiated, the Church disestablished, the royal family set adrift to make its own living, the sinecurists cut off, the army disbanded, the navy’s officers and men discharged and its ships sold. Taxation could then be cut enormously. The net produce left to be divided among the parties to production would grow greatly. But it would be only the kind of addition that improvement in the arts has long been making constantly, and not as great as steam and machinery have added in the last twenty or thirty years. Those additions have not relieved pauperism but have only raised rent, and so would this one. English landowners would reap the whole benefit. I will not deny that if all this could be done suddenly, without the destruction and expense of a revolution, the lowest class might temporarily improve.300 But such a sudden and peaceful reform is plainly impossible. And if it were possible, any temporary improvement would be swallowed up in the end by higher land values, by the same process we now see at work in the United States.

And, so, in the United States, if we were to reduce public expenditures to the lowest possible point, and meet them by revenue taxation, the benefit could certainly not be greater than that which railroads have brought. There would be more wealth left in the hands of the people as a whole, just as the railroads have put more wealth in the hands of the people as a whole, but the same inexorable laws would operate as to its distribution. The condition of those who live by their labor would not ultimately be improved.

The same holds in the United States. Suppose we cut public expenditures to the lowest possible point and met them by taxing for revenue only. The benefit could certainly be no greater than the benefit railroads have brought. The people as a whole would have more wealth left in their hands, just as the railroads have put more wealth in their hands, but the same inexorable laws would govern its distribution. The condition of those who live by their labor would not improve in the end.

A dim consciousness of this pervades—or, rather, is beginning to pervade—the masses, and constitutes one of the grave political difficulties that are closing in around the American republic. Those who have nothing but their labor, and especially the proletarians of the cities—a growing class—care little about the prodigality of government, and in many cases are disposed to look upon it as a good thing—“furnishing employment,” or “putting money in circulation.” Tweed, who robbed New York as a guerrilla chief might levy upon a captured town (and who was but a type of the new banditti who are grasping the government of all our cities), was undoubtedly popular with a majority of the voters, though his thieving was notorious, and his spoils were blazoned in big diamonds and lavish personal expenditure. After his indictment, he was triumphantly elected to the Senate; and, even when a recaptured fugitive, was frequently cheered on his way from court to prison. He had robbed the public treasury of many millions, but the proletarians felt that he had not robbed them. And the verdict of political economy is the same as theirs.

The masses have a dim awareness of this, or rather are beginning to have it, and it is one of the grave political difficulties closing in around the American republic. Those who have nothing but their labor, especially the proletarians of the cities, a growing class, care little about government extravagance. In many cases they are inclined to see it as a good thing that “furnishes employment” or “puts money in circulation.” Tweed, the boss of New York’s Tammany machine, robbed the city as a guerrilla chief might levy on a captured town. He was only one type of the new banditti who are seizing the government of all our cities. Undoubtedly he was popular with a majority of the voters, though his thieving was notorious and his spoils were displayed in big diamonds and lavish personal spending. After his indictment he was triumphantly elected to the Senate, and even as a recaptured fugitive he was often cheered on his way from court to prison. He had robbed the public treasury of many millions, but the proletarians felt he had not robbed them. And the verdict of economics is the same as theirs.

Let me be clearly understood. I do not say that gov301ernmental economy is not desirable; but simply that reduction in the expenses of government can have no direct effect in extirpating poverty and increasing wages, so long as land is monopolized.

Let me be clearly understood. I do not say that government economy is not desirable.301 I say only that reducing the expenses of government can have no direct effect in wiping out poverty and raising wages, as long as land is monopolized.

Although this is true, yet even with sole reference to the interests of the lowest class, no effort should be spared to keep down useless expenditures. The more complex and extravagant government becomes, the more it gets to be a power distinct from and independent of the people, and the more difficult does it become to bring questions of real public policy to a popular decision. Look at our elections in the United States—upon what do they turn? The most momentous problems are pressing upon us, yet so great is the amount of money in politics, so large are the personal interests involved, that the most important questions of government are but little considered. The average American voter has prejudices, party feelings, general notions of a certain kind, but he gives to the fundamental questions of government not much more thought than a street-car horse does to the profits of the line. Were this not the case, so many hoary abuses could not have survived and so many new ones been added. Anything that tends to make government simple and inexpensive tends to put it under control of the people and to bring questions of real importance to the front. But no reduction in the expenses of government can of itself cure or mitigate the evils that arise from a constant tendency to the unequal distribution of wealth.

Even so, with only the interests of the lowest class in view, no effort should be spared to keep down useless expenditures. The more complex and extravagant government becomes, the more it becomes a power separate from and independent of the people, and the harder it is to bring questions of real public policy to a popular decision. Look at our elections in the United States. What do they turn on? The most momentous problems press upon us, yet there is so much money in politics and so many personal interests at stake that the most important questions of government get little consideration. The average American voter has prejudices, party feelings and general notions of a certain kind, but he gives the fundamental questions of government not much more thought than a street-car horse gives to the profits of the line. Were this not so, so many hoary abuses could not have survived and so many new ones been added. Anything that makes government simple and inexpensive tends to put it under the people’s control and to bring questions of real importance to the front. But no reduction in the expenses of government can of itself cure or ease the evils that come from a constant tendency to unequal distribution of wealth.

There is, and always has been, a widespread belief among the more comfortable classes that the poverty and suffering of the masses are due to their lack of industry, frugality, and intelligence. This belief, which at once302 soothes the sense of responsibility and flatters by its suggestion of superiority, is probably even more prevalent in countries like the United States, where all men are politically equal, and where, owing to the newness of society, the differentiation into classes has been of individuals rather than of families, than it is in older countries, where the lines of separation have been longer, and are more sharply, drawn. It is but natural for those who can trace their own better circumstances to the superior industry and frugality that gave them a start, and the superior intelligence that enabled them to take advantage of every opportunity,44 to imagine that those who remain poor do so simply from lack of these qualities.

There is, and always has been, a widespread belief among the more comfortable classes that the poverty and suffering of the masses come from their lack of industry, frugality and intelligence. This belief soothes the sense of responsibility and flatters by suggesting superiority.302 It is probably even more common in countries like the United States, where all men are politically equal and where, because society is new, the division into classes has been of individuals rather than of families. In older countries the lines of separation have been drawn longer and more sharply. Some people can trace their better circumstances to the superior industry and frugality that gave them a start, and the superior intelligence that let them take advantage of every opportunity.44 It is natural for them to imagine that those who stay poor do so simply for lack of these qualities.

But whoever has grasped the laws of the distribution of wealth, as in previous chapters they have been traced out, will see the mistake in this notion. The fallacy is similar to that which would be involved in the assertion that every one of a number of competitors might win a race. That any one might is true; that every one might is impossible.

But anyone who has grasped the laws of the distribution of wealth, as traced in earlier chapters, will see the mistake. It is the same fallacy as asserting that every one of a number of competitors might win a race. That any one might is true. That every one might is impossible.

For, as soon as land acquires a value, wages, as we have seen, do not depend upon the real earnings or product of labor, but upon what is left to labor after rent is taken out; and when land is all monopolized, as it is everywhere except in the newest communities, rent must drive wages down to the point at which the poorest paid class will be just able to live and reproduce, and thus wages are forced to a minimum fixed by what is called the standard of comfort—that is, the amount of necessaries and comforts which habit leads the working classes to demand as the lowest on which they will consent to maintain their numbers. This being the case, industry,303 skill, frugality, and intelligence can avail the individual only in so far as they are superior to the general level—just as in a race speed can avail the runner only in so far as it exceeds that of his competitors. If one man work harder, or with superior skill or intelligence than ordinary, he will get ahead; but if the average of industry, skill, or intelligence be brought up to the higher point, the increased intensity of application will secure but the old rate of wages, and he who would get ahead must work harder still.

As soon as land acquires a value, wages, as we have seen, depend not on the real earnings or product of labor but on what is left to labor after rent is taken out. When land is all monopolized, as it is everywhere except in the newest communities, rent must drive wages down to the point at which the poorest paid class can just live and reproduce. Wages are thus forced to a minimum fixed by what is called the standard of comfort. That is the set of necessaries and comforts that habit leads the working classes to demand as the least on which they will agree to keep up their numbers.303 This being so, industry, skill, frugality and intelligence can help an individual only so far as they are above the general level, just as in a race speed helps the runner only so far as it exceeds his competitors’. A man who works harder than ordinary, or with more skill or intelligence, will get ahead. But if the average of industry, skill or intelligence rises to the higher point, the greater effort will secure only the old rate of wages, and whoever wants to get ahead must work harder still.

One individual may save money from his wages by living as Dr. Franklin did when, during his apprenticeship and early journeyman days, he concluded to practice vegetarianism; and many poor families might be made more comfortable by being taught to prepare the cheap dishes to which Franklin tried to limit the appetite of his employer Keimer, as a condition to his acceptance of the position of confuter of opponents to the new religion of which Keimer wished to become the prophet,45 but if the working classes generally came to live in that way, wages would ultimately fall in proportion, and whoever wished to get ahead by the practice of economy, or to mitigate poverty by teaching it, would be compelled to devise some still cheaper mode of keeping soul and body together. If, under existing conditions, American mechanics would come down to the Chinese standard of living, they would ultimately have to come down to the Chinese standard of wages; or if English laborers would content themselves with the rice diet and scanty clothing of the Bengalee, labor would soon be as ill paid in England as in Bengal. The introduction of the potato into Ireland was expected to improve the condition of the poorer classes, by increasing the difference between the304 wages they received and the cost of their living. The consequences that did ensue were a rise of rent and a lowering of wages, and, with the potato blight, the ravages of famine among a population that had already reduced its standard of comfort so low that the next step was starvation.

One individual may save money from his wages by living as Dr. Franklin did when, as an apprentice and young journeyman, he decided to practice vegetarianism. Many poor families might be made more comfortable by being taught to prepare the cheap dishes to which Franklin tried to limit the appetite of his employer Keimer. Franklin did so as a condition of accepting the job of confuting opponents of the new religion Keimer wanted to found.45 But if the working classes generally came to live that way, wages would in the end fall in proportion. Whoever wanted to get ahead by economy, or to ease poverty by teaching it, would have to devise some still cheaper way of keeping body and soul together. If American mechanics came down to the Chinese standard of living under existing conditions, they would in the end have to come down to the Chinese standard of wages. If English laborers made do with the rice diet and scanty clothing of the Bengalee, labor would soon be as ill paid in England as in Bengal. The introduction of the potato into Ireland was expected to improve the condition of the poorer classes by widening the gap between the wages they received and the cost of living.304 What followed was a rise of rent and a lowering of wages. Then came the potato blight and the ravages of famine, among a population that had already lowered its standard of comfort so far that the next step was starvation.

And, so, if one individual work more hours than the average, he will increase his wages; but the wages of all cannot be increased in this way. It is notorious that in occupations where working hours are long, wages are not higher than where working hours are shorter; generally the reverse, for the longer the working day, the more helpless does the laborer become—the less time has he to look around him and develop other powers than those called forth by his work; the less becomes his ability to change his occupation or to take advantage of circumstances. And, so, the individual workman who gets his wife and children to assist him may thus increase his income; but in occupations where it has become habitual for the wife and children of the laborer to supplement his work, it is notorious that the wages earned by the whole family do not on the average exceed those of the head of the family in occupations where it is usual for him only to work. Swiss family labor in watch making competes in cheapness with American machinery. The Bohemian cigar makers of New York, who work, men, women, and children, in their tenement-house rooms, have reduced the prices of cigar making to less than the Chinese in San Francisco were getting.

In the same way, an individual who works more hours than average will increase his wages, but the wages of all cannot be increased that way. It is notorious that wages are no higher in occupations with long working hours than in those with shorter hours, and are generally lower. The longer the working day, the more helpless the laborer becomes. He has less time to look around him and develop powers other than those his work calls for, and less ability to change his occupation or take advantage of circumstances. Likewise, a workman who gets his wife and children to help him may increase his income. Where it has become habitual for the wife and children to supplement the laborer’s work, it is notorious that the whole family’s wages do not on average exceed those of the head of the family in occupations where he usually works alone. Swiss family labor in watchmaking competes in cheapness with American machinery. The Bohemian cigar makers of New York, men, women and children working together in their tenement rooms, have cut the prices of cigar making below what the Chinese in San Francisco were getting.

These general facts are well known. They are fully recognized in standard politico-economic works, where, however, they are explained upon the Malthusian theory of the tendency of population to multiply up to the limit of subsistence. The true explanation, as I have sufficiently shown, is in the tendency of rent to reduce wages.

These general facts are well known. Standard works of economics fully recognize them, though they explain them by the Malthusian theory that population tends to multiply up to the limit of subsistence. The true explanation, as I have sufficiently shown, is the tendency of rent to reduce wages.

As to the effects of education, it may be worth while to say a few words specially, for there is a prevailing disposition to attribute to it something like a magical influence. Now, education is only education in so far as it enables a man more effectively to use his natural powers, and this is something that what we call education in very great part fails to do. I remember a little girl, pretty well along in her school geography and astronomy, who was much astonished to find that the ground in her mother’s back yard was really the surface of the earth, and, if you talk with them, you will find that a good deal of the knowledge of many college graduates is much like that of the little girl. They seldom think any better, and sometimes not so well as men who have never been to college.

Education deserves a few special words, because people are inclined to credit it with something like magical influence. Education is education only so far as it lets a man use his natural powers more effectively, and what we call education very largely fails to do this. I remember a little girl, well along in her school geography and astronomy, who was astonished to find that the ground in her mother’s back yard was really the surface of the earth. If you talk with many college graduates, you will find much of their knowledge is like that little girl’s. They seldom think any better than men who have never been to college, and sometimes not as well.

A gentleman who had spent many years in Australia, and knew intimately the habits of the aborigines (Rev. Dr. Bleesdale), after giving some instances of their wonderful skill in the use of their weapons, in foretelling changes in the wind and weather and in trapping the shyest birds, once said to me: “I think it a great mistake to look on these black fellows as ignorant. Their knowledge is different from ours, but in it they are generally better educated. As soon as they begin to toddle, they are taught to play with little boomerangs and other weapons, to observe and to judge, and, when they are old enough to take care of themselves, they are fully able to do so—are, in fact, in reference to the nature of their knowledge, what I should call well-educated gentlemen; which is more than I can say for many of our young fellows who have had what we call the best advantages, but who enter upon manhood unable to do anything either for themselves or for others.”

A gentleman who had spent many years in Australia and knew the habits of the aborigines intimately, the Rev. Dr. Bleesdale, once said to me, after giving some examples of their wonderful skill with weapons, in foretelling changes in wind and weather, and in trapping the shyest birds: “I think it a great mistake to look on these black fellows as ignorant. Their knowledge is different from ours, but in it they are generally better educated. As soon as they begin to toddle, they are taught to play with little boomerangs and other weapons, to observe and to judge. When they are old enough to take care of themselves, they are fully able to do so. In reference to the nature of their knowledge, they are what I should call well-educated gentlemen. I cannot say as much for many of our young fellows who have had what we call the best advantages, but who enter manhood unable to do anything either for themselves or for others.”

Be this as it may, it is evident that intelligence, which is or should be the aim of education, until it induces and enables the masses to discover and remove the cause of306 the unequal distribution of wealth, can operate upon wages only by increasing the effective power of labor. It has the same effect as increased skill or industry. And it can raise the wages of the individual only in so far as it renders him superior to others. When to read and write were rare accomplishments, a clerk commanded high respect and large wages, but now the ability to read and write has become so nearly universal as to give no advantage. Among the Chinese the ability to read and write seems absolutely universal, but wages in China touch the lowest possible point. The diffusion of intelligence, except as it may make men discontented with a state of things which condemns producers to a life of toil while non-producers loll in luxury, cannot tend to raise wages generally, or in any way improve the condition of the lowest class—the “mud-sills” of society, as a Southern Senator once called them—who must rest on the soil, no matter how high the superstructure may be carried. No increase of the effective power of labor can increase general wages, so long as rent swallows up all the gain. This is not merely a deduction from principles. It is the fact, proved by experience. The growth of knowledge and the progress of invention have multiplied the effective power of labor over and over again without increasing wages. In England there are over a million paupers. In the United States almshouses are increasing and wages are decreasing.

Be that as it may, intelligence is or should be the aim of education. Unless it leads and enables the masses to discover and remove the cause of the unequal distribution of wealth, it can operate on wages only by increasing the effective power of labor.306 It then has the same effect as increased skill or industry. And it can raise an individual’s wages only so far as it makes him superior to others. When reading and writing were rare accomplishments, a clerk commanded high respect and large wages. Now the ability to read and write is so nearly universal that it gives no advantage. Among the Chinese it seems absolutely universal, yet wages in China touch the lowest possible point. The spread of intelligence cannot raise wages generally or improve the condition of the lowest class, except by making men discontented with a state of things that condemns producers to a life of toil while non-producers loll in luxury. That lowest class is the “mud-sills” of society, as a Southern Senator once called them, who must rest on the soil however high the superstructure is carried. No increase in the effective power of labor can raise general wages while rent swallows up all the gain. This is not merely a deduction from principles. It is a fact proved by experience. The growth of knowledge and the progress of invention have multiplied the effective power of labor over and over without increasing wages. In England there are over a million paupers. In the United States almshouses are increasing and wages are decreasing.

It is true that greater industry and skill, greater prudence, and a higher intelligence, are, as a rule, found associated with a better material condition of the working classes; but that this is effect, not cause, is shown by the relation of the facts. Wherever the material condition of the laboring classes has been improved, improvement in their personal qualities has followed, and wherever their material condition has been depressed, deterioration in these qualities has been the result; but nowhere307 can improvement in material condition be shown as the result of the increase of industry, skill, prudence, or intelligence in a class condemned to toil for a bare living, though these qualities when once attained (or, rather, their concomitant—the improvement in the standard of comfort) offer a strong, and, in many cases, a sufficient, resistance to the lowering of material condition.

It is true that greater industry and skill, greater prudence and higher intelligence are, as a rule, found together with a better material condition of the working classes. But the facts show that this is effect, not cause. Wherever the material condition of the laboring classes has improved, improvement in their personal qualities has followed. Wherever it has been depressed, those qualities have deteriorated.307 But nowhere can an improvement in material condition be shown to result from greater industry, skill, prudence or intelligence in a class condemned to toil for a bare living. Once attained, these qualities, or rather the rise in the standard of comfort that goes with them, do offer strong resistance, often sufficient, to a lowering of material condition.

The fact is, that the qualities that raise man above the animal are superimposed on those which he shares with the animal, and that it is only as he is relieved from the wants of his animal nature that his intellectual and moral nature can grow. Compel a man to drudgery for the necessities of animal existence, and he will lose the incentive to industry—the progenitor of skill—and will do only what he is forced to do. Make his condition such that it cannot be much worse, while there is little hope that anything he can do will make it much better, and he will cease to look beyond the day. Deny him leisure—and leisure does not mean the want of employment, but the absence of the need which forces to uncongenial employment—and you cannot, even by running the child through a common school and supplying the man with a newspaper, make him intelligent.

The qualities that raise man above the animal are laid on top of those he shares with the animal, and his intellectual and moral nature can grow only as he is relieved from the wants of his animal nature. Force a man to drudgery for the necessities of animal existence, and he loses the incentive to industry, which is the parent of skill, and does only what he is forced to do. Make his condition such that it cannot be much worse, while there is little hope that anything he does will make it much better, and he will stop looking beyond the day. Deny him leisure, which means not the lack of employment but the absence of the need that forces him into uncongenial employment. Then you cannot make him intelligent, even by running the child through a common school and supplying the man with a newspaper.

It is true that improvement in the material condition of a people or class may not show immediately in mental and moral improvement. Increased wages may at first be taken out in idleness and dissipation. But they will ultimately bring increased industry, skill, intelligence, and thrift. Comparisons between different countries; between different classes in the same country; between the same people at different periods; and between the same people when their conditions are changed by emigration, show, as an invariable result, that the personal qualities of which we are speaking appear as material conditions are improved, and disappear as material conditions are depressed. Poverty is the Slough of Despond308 which Bunyan saw in his dream, and into which good books may be tossed forever without result. To make people industrious, prudent, skillful, and intelligent, they must be relieved from want. If you would have the slave show the virtues of the freeman, you must first make him free.

It is true that an improvement in the material condition of a people or class may not show at once in mental and moral improvement. Higher wages may at first be spent on idleness and dissipation. But in the end they bring more industry, skill, intelligence and thrift. Comparisons between different countries, between different classes in the same country, between the same people at different periods, and between the same people when emigration changes their conditions all show the same invariable result. The personal qualities we are speaking of appear as material conditions improve, and disappear as they are depressed.308 Poverty is the Slough of Despond that John Bunyan saw in his dream, into which good books may be tossed forever without result. To make people industrious, prudent, skillful and intelligent, you must relieve them from want. If you want the slave to show the virtues of the freeman, you must first make him free.

It is evident from the laws of distribution, as previously traced, that combinations of workmen can advance wages, and this not at the expense of other workmen, as is sometimes said, nor yet at the expense of capital, as is generally believed; but, ultimately, at the expense of rent. That no general advance in wages can be secured by combination; that any advance in particular wages thus secured must reduce other wages or the profits of capital, or both—are ideas that spring from the erroneous notion that wages are drawn from capital. The fallacy of these ideas is demonstrated, not alone by the laws of distribution as we have worked them out, but by experience, so far as it has gone. The advance of wages in particular trades by combinations of workmen, of which there are many examples, has nowhere shown any effect in lowering wages in other trades, or in reducing the rate of profits. Except as it may affect his fixed capital or current engagements, a diminution of wages can benefit, and an increase of wages injure an employer only in so far as it gives him an advantage or puts him at a disadvantage as compared with other employers. The employer who first succeeds in reducing the wages of his hands, or is first compelled to pay an advance, gains an advantage, or is put at a disadvantage in regard to his competitors, which ceases when the movement includes them also. So far, however, as the change in wages affects his contracts or stock on hand, by changing the relative cost of production, it may be to him a real309 gain or loss, though this gain or loss, being purely relative, disappears when the whole community is considered. And, if the change in wages works a change in relative demand, it may render capital fixed in machinery, buildings, or otherwise, more or less profitable. But, in this, a new equilibrium is soon reached; for, especially in a progressive country, fixed capital is only somewhat less mobile than circulating capital. If there is too little in a certain form, the tendency of capital to assume that form soon brings it up to the required amount; if there is too much, the cessation of increment soon restores the level.

The laws of distribution, as previously traced, make it evident that combinations of workmen can advance wages. They do so not at the expense of other workmen, as is sometimes said, nor at the expense of capital, as is generally believed, but in the end at the expense of rent. Two ideas spring from the mistaken notion that wages are drawn from capital. One is that no general advance in wages can be secured by combination. The other is that any advance in particular wages thus secured must reduce other wages or the profits of capital or both. The laws of distribution as we have worked them out show the error of these ideas, and so does experience, as far as it has gone. Combinations of workmen have advanced wages in particular trades in many cases, and nowhere has this lowered wages in other trades or reduced the rate of profits. Except as it affects his fixed capital or current engagements, a cut in wages can benefit an employer, and a rise injure him, only so far as it gives him an advantage or disadvantage against other employers. The employer who first succeeds in cutting his hands’ wages, or is first compelled to pay more, gains an advantage or suffers a disadvantage against his competitors, and this ceases when the movement includes them too. So far as the change in wages affects his contracts or stock on hand, by changing the relative cost of production, it may be a real gain or loss to him.309 But since this gain or loss is purely relative, it disappears when the whole community is considered. And if the change in wages changes relative demand, it may make capital fixed in machinery, buildings or otherwise more or less profitable. But a new equilibrium is soon reached here, because, especially in a progressive country, fixed capital is only somewhat less mobile than circulating capital. If there is too little in a certain form, the tendency of capital to take that form soon brings it up to the required amount. If there is too much, the end of new additions soon restores the level.

But, while a change in the rate of wages in any particular occupation may induce a change in the relative demand for labor, it can produce no change in the aggregate demand. For instance, let us suppose that a combination of the workmen engaged in any particular manufacture raise wages in one country, while a combination of employers reduce wages in the same manufacture in another country. If the change be great enough, the demand, or part of the demand, in the first country will now be supplied by importation of such manufactures from the second. But, evidently, this increase in importations of a particular kind must necessitate either a corresponding decrease in importations of other kinds, or a corresponding increase in exportations. For, it is only with the produce of its labor and capital that one country can demand, or can obtain, in exchange, the produce of the labor and capital of another. The idea that the lowering of wages can increase, or the increase of wages can diminish, the trade of a country, is as baseless as the idea that the prosperity of a country can be increased by taxes on imports, or diminished by the removal of restrictions on trade. If all wages in any particular country were to be doubled, that country would continue to export and import the same things,310 and in the same proportions; for exchange is determined not by absolute, but by relative, cost of production. But, if wages in some branches of production were doubled, and in others not increased, or not increased so much, there would be a change in the proportion of the various things imported, but no change in the proportion between exports and imports.

A change in the rate of wages in a particular occupation may change the relative demand for labor, but it cannot change the aggregate demand. Suppose, for instance, that a combination of workmen in some manufacture raises wages in one country, while a combination of employers cuts wages in the same manufacture in another country. If the change is great enough, the first country will supply some or all of its demand by importing such goods from the second. But this increase in one kind of imports must plainly require either a matching decrease in other imports or a matching increase in exports. A country can demand, or obtain in exchange, the produce of another country’s labor and capital only with the produce of its own labor and capital. The idea that lowering wages can increase a country’s trade, or raising them diminish it, is as baseless as the idea that taxes on imports can increase a country’s prosperity or that removing restrictions on trade can diminish it. If all wages in a country were doubled, it would go on exporting and importing the same things,310 in the same proportions, because exchange is determined by relative cost of production, not absolute. If wages in some branches of production were doubled and in others not raised, or not raised as much, the proportions among the various imports would change. The proportion between exports and imports would not.

While most of the objections made to the combination of workmen for the advance of wages are thus baseless, while the success of such combinations cannot reduce other wages, or decrease the profits of capital, or injuriously affect national prosperity, yet so great are the difficulties in the way of the effective combinations of laborers, that the good that can be accomplished by them is extremely limited, while there are inherent disadvantages in the process.

Most of the objections made to combinations of workmen to advance wages are baseless. Their success cannot reduce other wages, decrease the profits of capital or harm national prosperity. Even so, the difficulties in the way of effective combinations of laborers are so great that the good they can do is extremely limited, and the process has inherent disadvantages.

To raise wages in a particular occupation or occupations, which is all that any combination of workmen yet made has been equal to attempting, is manifestly a task the difficulty of which progressively increases. For the higher are wages of any particular kind raised above their normal level with other wages, the stronger are the tendencies to bring them back. Thus, if a printers’ union, by a successful or threatened strike, raise the wages of typesetting ten per cent. above the normal rate as compared with other wages, relative demand and supply are at once affected. On the one hand, there is a tendency to a diminution of the amount of typesetting called for; and, on the other, the higher rate of wages tends to increase the number of compositors in ways the strongest combination cannot altogether prevent. If the increase be twenty per cent., these tendencies are much stronger; if it is fifty per cent., they become stronger still, and so on. So that practically—even in countries like England, where the lines between different trades are much more distinct and difficult to pass than in countries like the311 United States—that which trades’ unions, even when supporting each other, can do in the way of raising wages is comparatively little, and this little, moreover, is confined to their own sphere, and does not affect the lower stratum of unorganized laborers, whose condition most needs alleviation and ultimately determines that of all above them. The only way by which wages could be raised to any extent and with any permanence by this method would be by a general combination, such as was aimed at by the Internationals, which should include laborers of all kinds. But such a combination may be set down as practically impossible, for the difficulties of combination, great enough in the most highly paid and smallest trades, become greater and greater as we descend in the industrial scale.

To raise wages in a particular occupation or occupations is all that any combination of workmen has yet attempted, and it is plainly a task that grows harder as it proceeds. The further wages of any one kind are raised above their normal level relative to other wages, the stronger the pull back. Suppose a printers’ union, by a successful or threatened strike, raises the wages of typesetting ten per cent. above the normal rate compared with other wages. Relative demand and supply are at once affected. On one side, less typesetting tends to be called for. On the other, the higher wages tend to draw in more compositors, in ways even the strongest combination cannot altogether prevent. If the increase is twenty per cent., these tendencies are much stronger, and at fifty per cent. stronger still. So in practice trades’ unions can do comparatively little to raise wages, even when they support each other. This holds even in countries like England, where the lines between trades are much more distinct and harder to cross than in countries like the United States.311 That little is confined to their own sphere. It does not reach the lower stratum of unorganized laborers, whose condition most needs relief and ultimately determines the condition of all above them. The only way to raise wages substantially and permanently by this method would be a general combination of laborers of all kinds, such as the Internationals aimed at. But such a combination is practically impossible. The difficulties of combining, great enough in the most highly paid and smallest trades, grow greater and greater as we go down the industrial scale.

Nor, in the struggle of endurance, which is the only method which combinations not to work for less than a certain minimum have of effecting the increase of wages, must it be forgotten who are the real parties pitted against each other. It is not labor and capital. It is laborers on the one side and the owners of land on the other. If the contest were between labor and capital, it would be on much more equal terms. For the power of capital to stand out is only some little greater than that of labor. Capital not only ceases to earn anything when not used, but it goes to waste—for in nearly all its forms it can be maintained only by constant reproduction. But land will not starve like laborers or go to waste like capital—its owners can wait. They may be inconvenienced, it is true, but what is inconvenience to them, is destruction to capital and starvation to labor.

In the struggle of endurance, which is the only way combinations not to work for less than a certain minimum can raise wages, we must not forget who the real parties are. It is not labor and capital. It is laborers on one side and the owners of land on the other. If the contest were between labor and capital, the terms would be much more equal, because capital can hold out only a little longer than labor. Capital earns nothing when not used, and it also goes to waste, since in nearly all its forms it can be maintained only by constant reproduction. But land will not starve like laborers or go to waste like capital, and its owners can wait. They may be inconvenienced, it is true, but what is inconvenience to them is destruction to capital and starvation to labor.

The agricultural laborers in certain parts of England are now endeavoring to combine for the purpose of securing an increase in their miserably low wages. If it was capital that was receiving the enormous difference between the real produce of their labor and the pittance312 they get out of it, they would have but to make an effective combination to secure success; for the farmers, who are their direct employers, can afford to go without labor but little, if any, better than the laborers can afford to go without wages. But the farmers cannot yield much without a reduction of rent; and thus it is between the land owners and the laborers that the real struggle must come. Suppose the combination to be so thorough as to include all agricultural laborers, and to prevent from doing so all who might be tempted to take their places. The laborers refuse to work except at a considerable advance of wages; the farmers can give it only by securing a considerable reduction of rent, and have no way to back their demands except as the laborers back theirs, by refusing to go on with production. If cultivation thus comes to a dead-lock, the land owners would lose only their rent, while the land improved by lying fallow. But the laborers would starve. And if English laborers of all kinds were united in one grand league for a general increase of wages, the real contest would be the same, and under the same conditions. For wages could not be increased except to the decrease of rent; and in a general dead-lock, land owners could live, while laborers of all sorts must starve or emigrate. The owners of the land of England are by virtue of their ownership the masters of England. So true is it that “to whomsoever the soil at any time belongs, to him belong the fruits of it.” The white parasols and the elephants mad with pride passed with the grant of English land, and the people at large can never regain their power until that grant is resumed. What is true of England, is universally true.

Agricultural laborers in certain parts of England are now trying to combine to raise their miserably low wages. If capital were receiving the enormous difference between the real produce of their labor and the pittance they get from it, they would need only an effective combination to succeed.312 The farmers, who employ them directly, can do without labor little if any better than the laborers can do without wages. But the farmers cannot yield much without a reduction of rent, so the real struggle must come between the landowners and the laborers. Suppose the combination were so thorough that it included all agricultural laborers and kept away everyone who might be tempted to take their places. The laborers refuse to work except at a considerable rise in wages. The farmers can grant it only by getting a considerable reduction of rent, and they have no way to back their demands except as the laborers back theirs, by refusing to go on with production. If cultivation thus reaches a dead-lock, the landowners would lose only their rent, and the land would be improved by lying fallow. But the laborers would starve. And if English laborers of all kinds united in one grand league for a general increase of wages, the real contest would be the same, under the same conditions. Wages could not be increased except by decreasing rent, and in a general dead-lock the landowners could live while laborers of every sort must starve or emigrate. By virtue of their ownership, the owners of the land of England are the masters of England. So true is it that “to whomsoever the soil at any time belongs, to him belong the fruits of it.” The white parasols and the elephants mad with pride passed with the grant of English land, and the people at large can never regain their power until that grant is resumed. What is true of England is universally true.

It may be said that such a dead-lock in production could never occur. This is true; but true only because no such thorough combination of labor as might produce it is possible. But the fixed and definite nature of land313 enables land owners to combine much more easily and efficiently than either laborers or capitalists. How easy and efficient their combination is, there are many historical examples. And the absolute necessity for the use of land, and the certainty in all progressive countries that it must increase in value, produce among land owners, without any formal combination, all the effects that could be produced by the most rigorous combination among laborers or capitalists. Deprive a laborer of opportunity of employment, and he will soon be anxious to get work on any terms, but when the receding wave of speculation leaves nominal land values clearly above real values, whoever has lived in a growing country knows with what tenacity land owners hold on.

It may be said that such a dead-lock in production could never occur. That is true, but only because no combination of labor thorough enough to produce it is possible.313 The fixed and definite nature of land lets landowners combine much more easily and efficiently than laborers or capitalists. History offers many examples of how easy and efficient their combination is. And because land is absolutely necessary and certain, in all progressive countries, to increase in value, landowners produce, without any formal combination, all the effects the most rigorous combination of laborers or capitalists could produce. Deprive a laborer of the opportunity of employment, and he will soon be anxious to get work on any terms. But when the receding wave of speculation leaves nominal land values clearly above real values, anyone who has lived in a growing country knows how tenaciously landowners hold on.

And, besides these practical difficulties in the plan of forcing by endurance an increase of wages, there are in such methods inherent disadvantages which workingmen should not blink. I speak without prejudice, for I am still an honorary member of the union which, while working at my trade, I always loyally supported. But, see: The methods by which a trade union can alone act are necessarily destructive; its organization is necessarily tyrannical. A strike, which is the only recourse by which a trade union can enforce its demands, is a destructive contest—just such a contest as that to which an eccentric, called “The Money King,” once, in the early days of San Francisco, challenged a man who had taunted him with meanness, that they should go down to the wharf and alternately toss twenty-dollar pieces into the bay until one gave in. The struggle of endurance involved in a strike is, really, what it has often been compared to—a war; and, like all war, it lessens wealth. And the organization for it must, like the organization for war, be tyrannical. As even the man who would fight for freedom, must, when he enters an army, give up his personal freedom and become a314 mere part in a great machine, so must it be with workmen who organize for a strike. These combinations are, therefore, necessarily destructive of the very things which workmen seek to gain through them—wealth and freedom.

Besides these practical difficulties in forcing wages up by endurance, such methods have inherent disadvantages that workingmen should not blink. I speak without prejudice, for I am still an honorary member of the union that I always loyally supported while working at my trade. But consider. The methods a trade union can use are necessarily destructive, and its organization is necessarily tyrannical. A strike, the only recourse by which a trade union can enforce its demands, is a destructive contest. It is just the kind of contest to which an eccentric called “The Money King” once challenged, in the early days of San Francisco, a man who had taunted him with meanness. They were to go down to the wharf and take turns tossing twenty-dollar pieces into the bay until one gave in. The struggle of endurance in a strike is really what it has often been compared to, a war, and like all war it lessens wealth. And the organization for it must, like the organization for war, be tyrannical. Even the man who would fight for freedom must give up his personal freedom when he enters an army and become a mere part of a great machine.314 So it must be with workmen who organize for a strike. These combinations are therefore necessarily destructive of the very things workmen seek through them, wealth and freedom.

There is an ancient Hindoo mode of compelling the payment of a just debt, traces of something akin to which Sir Henry Maine has found in the laws of the Irish Brehons. It is called, sitting dharna—the creditor seeking enforcement of his debt by sitting down at the door of the debtor, and refusing to eat or drink until he is paid.

There is an ancient Hindu way of compelling payment of a just debt, and Sir Henry Maine has found traces of something like it in the laws of the Irish Brehons. It is called sitting dharna. The creditor sits down at the debtor’s door and refuses to eat or drink until he is paid.

Like this is the method of labor combinations. In their strikes, trades’ unions sit dharna. But, unlike the Hindoo, they have not the power of superstition to back them.

The method of labor combinations is like this. In their strikes, trades’ unions sit dharna. But unlike the Hindu, they do not have the power of superstition to back them.

It is now, and has been for some time, the fashion to preach co-operation as the sovereign remedy for the grievances of the working classes. But, unfortunately for the efficacy of co-operation as a remedy for social evils, these evils, as we have seen, do not arise from any conflict between labor and capital; and if co-operation were universal, it could not raise wages or relieve poverty. This is readily seen.

For some time now it has been the fashion to preach co-operation as the sovereign remedy for the grievances of the working classes. Unfortunately for its power as a remedy for social evils, these evils, as we have seen, do not arise from any conflict between labor and capital. If co-operation were universal, it could not raise wages or relieve poverty. This is easy to see.

Co-operation is of two kinds—co-operation in supply and co-operation in production. Now, co-operation in supply, let it go as far as it may in excluding middlemen, only reduces the cost of exchanges. It is simply a device to save labor and eliminate risk, and its effect upon distribution can be only that of the improvements and inventions which have in modern times so wonderfully cheapened and facilitated exchanges—viz., to increase rent. And co-operation in production is simply a reversion to that form of wages which still prevails in the315 whaling service, and is there termed a “lay.” It is the substitution of proportionate wages for fixed wages—a substitution of which there are occasional instances in almost all employments; or, if the management is left to the workmen, and the capitalist but takes his proportion of the net produce, it is simply the system that has prevailed to a large extent in European agriculture since the days of the Roman Empire—the colonial or metayer system. All that is claimed for co-operation in production is, that it makes the workman more active and industrious—in other words, that it increases the efficiency of labor. Thus its effect is in the same direction as the steam engine, the cotton gin, the reaping machine—in short, all the things in which material progress consists, and it can produce only the same result—viz., the increase of rent.

Co-operation is of two kinds, co-operation in supply and co-operation in production. Co-operation in supply, however far it goes in excluding middlemen, only reduces the cost of exchanges. It is simply a device to save labor and eliminate risk, and its effect on distribution can be only that of the improvements and inventions that have so wonderfully cheapened and eased exchanges in modern times. That effect is to increase rent. And co-operation in production is simply a return to the form of wages that still prevails in the whaling service, where it is called a “lay.”315 It replaces fixed wages with proportionate wages, a replacement of which there are occasional instances in almost every kind of employment. Or the workmen may manage the business while the capitalist takes only his proportion of the net produce. That is simply the colonial or metayer system, which has prevailed widely in European agriculture since the days of the Roman Empire. All that is claimed for co-operation in production is that it makes the workman more active and industrious, in other words that it increases the efficiency of labor. Its effect therefore runs in the same direction as the steam engine, the cotton gin and the reaping machine, in short all the things that make up material progress. It can produce only the same result, an increase of rent.

It is a striking proof of how first principles are ignored in dealing with social problems, that in current economic and semi-economic literature so much importance is attached to co-operation as a means for increasing wages and relieving poverty. That it can have no such general tendency is apparent.

It is striking proof of how first principles are ignored in dealing with social problems that current economic and semi-economic writing attaches so much importance to co-operation as a means of increasing wages and relieving poverty. That it can have no such general tendency is plain.

Waiving all the difficulties that under present conditions beset co-operation either of supply or of production, and supposing it so extended as to supplant present methods—that co-operative stores made the connection between producer and consumer with the minimum of expense, and co-operative workshops, factories, farms, and mines, abolished the employing capitalist who pays fixed wages, and greatly increased the efficiency of labor—what then? Why, simply that it would become possible to produce the same amount of wealth with less labor, and consequently that the owners of land, the source of all wealth, could command a greater amount of wealth for the use of their land. This is not a matter of mere theory; it is proved by experience and by exist316ing facts. Improved methods and improved machinery have the same effect that co-operation aims at—of reducing the cost of bringing commodities to the consumer and increasing the efficiency of labor, and it is in these respects that the older countries have the advantage of new settlements. But, as experience has amply shown, improvements in the methods and machinery of production and exchange have no tendency to improve the condition of the lowest class, and wages are lower and poverty deeper where exchange goes on at the minimum of cost and production has the benefit of the best machinery. The advantage but adds to rent.

Set aside all the difficulties that now beset co-operation, whether of supply or of production. Suppose it so widespread that it supplanted present methods. Co-operative stores connect producer and consumer at minimum expense, and co-operative workshops, factories, farms and mines abolish the employing capitalist who pays fixed wages and greatly increase the efficiency of labor. What then? Simply that the same amount of wealth could be produced with less labor, and so the owners of land, the source of all wealth, could command a greater amount of wealth for the use of their land. This is not mere theory. Experience and existing facts prove it.316 Improved methods and machinery have the same effect that co-operation aims at, reducing the cost of bringing commodities to the consumer and increasing the efficiency of labor, and these are the respects in which older countries have the advantage over new settlements. But experience has amply shown that improvements in the methods and machinery of production and exchange do nothing to improve the condition of the lowest class. Wages are lower and poverty deeper where exchange goes on at the minimum cost and production has the best machinery. The advantage only adds to rent.

But suppose co-operation between producers and land owners? That would simply amount to the payment of rent in kind—the same system under which much land is rented in California and the Southern States where the land owner gets a share of the crop. Save as a matter of computation it in no wise differs from the system which prevails in England of a fixed money rent. Call it co-operation, if you choose, the terms of the co-operation would still be fixed by the laws which determine rent, and wherever land was monopolized, increase in productive power would simply give the owners of the land the power to demand a larger share.

But suppose co-operation between producers and landowners? That would amount simply to paying rent in kind, the same system under which much land is rented in California and the Southern States, where the landowner gets a share of the crop. Except as a matter of computation, it does not differ from the English system of a fixed money rent. Call it co-operation if you like. The terms would still be set by the laws that determine rent, and wherever land was monopolized, an increase in productive power would simply give the owners of the land the power to demand a larger share.

That co-operation is by so many believed to be the solution of the “labor question” arises from the fact that, where it has been tried, it has in many instances improved perceptibly the condition of those immediately engaged in it. But this is due simply to the fact that these cases are isolated. Just as industry, economy, or skill may improve the condition of the workmen who possess them in superior degree, but cease to have this effect when improvement in these respects becomes general, so a special advantage in procuring supplies, or a special efficiency given to some labor, may secure advantages which would be lost as soon as these improvements317 became so general as to affect the general relations of distribution. And the truth is, that, save possibly in educational effects, co-operation can produce no general results that competition will not produce. Just as the cheap-for-cash stores have a similar effect upon prices as the co-operative supply associations, so does competition in production lead to a similar adjustment of forces and division of proceeds as would co-operative production. That increasing productive power does not add to the reward of labor, is not because of competition, but because competition is one-sided. Land, without which there can be no production, is monopolized, and the competition of producers for its use forces wages to a minimum and gives all the advantage of increasing productive power to land owners, in higher rents and increased land values. Destroy this monopoly, and competition could exist only to accomplish the end which co-operation aims at—to give to each what he fairly earns. Destroy this monopoly, and industry must become the co-operation of equals.

Many believe co-operation is the solution of the “labor question” because, where it has been tried, it has in many cases noticeably improved the condition of those directly engaged in it. But this is due simply to the fact that these cases are isolated. Industry, economy or skill may improve the condition of the workmen who have them in superior degree, but cease to do so when improvement in these respects becomes general. In the same way, a special advantage in procuring supplies, or a special efficiency given to some labor, may secure advantages that would be lost as soon as these improvements became general enough to affect the general relations of distribution.317 The truth is that, except possibly in educational effects, co-operation can produce no general results that competition will not produce. Cheap-for-cash stores affect prices much as co-operative supply associations do, and competition in production leads to the same adjustment of forces and division of proceeds that co-operative production would. Increasing productive power does not add to the reward of labor, and the reason is not competition but that competition is one-sided. Land, without which there can be no production, is monopolized. The competition of producers for its use forces wages to a minimum and gives all the advantage of increasing productive power to landowners, in higher rents and increased land values. Destroy this monopoly, and competition could exist only to accomplish the end that co-operation aims at, to give each what he fairly earns. Destroy this monopoly, and industry must become the co-operation of equals.

The limits within which I wish to keep this book will not permit an examination in detail of the methods in which it is proposed to mitigate or extirpate poverty by governmental regulation of industry and accumulation, and which in their most thorough-going form are called socialistic. Nor is it necessary, for the same defects attach to them all. These are the substitution of governmental direction for the play of individual action, and the attempt to secure by restriction what can better be secured by freedom. As to the truths that are involved in socialistic ideas I shall have something to say hereafter; but it is evident that whatever savors of regulation and restriction is in itself bad, and should not be re318sorted to if any other mode of accomplishing the same end presents itself. For instance, to take one of the simplest and mildest of the class of measures I refer to—a graduated tax on incomes. The object at which it aims, the reduction or prevention of immense concentrations of wealth, is good; but this means involves the employment of a large number of officials clothed with inquisitorial powers; temptations to bribery, and perjury, and all other means of evasion, which beget a demoralization of opinion, and put a premium upon unscrupulousness and a tax upon conscience; and, finally, just in proportion as the tax accomplishes its effect, a lessening in the incentive to the accumulation of wealth, which is one of the strong forces of industrial progress. While, if the elaborate schemes for regulating everything and finding a place for everybody could be carried out, we should have a state of society resembling that of ancient Peru, or that which, to their eternal honor, the Jesuits instituted and so long maintained in Paraguay.

The limits I want to keep for this book do not allow a detailed examination of the methods proposed to ease or wipe out poverty through governmental regulation of industry and accumulation. In their most thorough-going form these are called socialistic. Nor is it necessary, since the same defects attach to all of them. They substitute governmental direction for the play of individual action, and they try to secure by restriction what can better be secured by freedom. I shall have something to say hereafter about the truths in socialistic ideas. But whatever savors of regulation and restriction is in itself bad, and should not be resorted to if any other way of reaching the same end is available.318 Take one of the simplest and mildest measures of this class, a graduated tax on incomes. Its aim, to reduce or prevent immense concentrations of wealth, is good. But the means requires a large number of officials with inquisitorial powers. It brings temptations to bribery, perjury and every other means of evasion, which demoralize opinion and put a premium on unscrupulousness and a tax on conscience. And finally, in just the proportion that the tax works, it lessens the incentive to accumulate wealth, which is one of the strong forces of industrial progress. Suppose the elaborate schemes for regulating everything and finding a place for everybody could be carried out. We should then have a society like that of ancient Peru, or like the one the Jesuits set up in Paraguay, to their eternal honor, and long maintained.

I will not say that such a state as this is not a better social state than that to which we now seem to be tending, for in ancient Peru, though production went on under the greatest disadvantages, from the want of iron and the domestic animals, yet there was no such thing as want, and the people went to their work with songs. But this it is unnecessary to discuss. Socialism in anything approaching such a form, modern society cannot successfully attempt. The only force that has ever proved competent for it—a strong and definite religious faith—is wanting and is daily growing less. We have passed out of the socialism of the tribal state, and cannot re-enter it again except by a retrogression that would involve anarchy and perhaps barbarism. Our governments, as is already plainly evident, would break down in the attempt. Instead of an intelligent award of duties and earnings, we should have a Roman distribu319tion of Sicilian corn, and the demagogue would soon become the Imperator.

I will not say that such a state is not a better social state than the one we now seem to be heading toward. In ancient Peru production went on under the greatest disadvantages, for lack of iron and domestic animals, yet there was no want, and the people went to their work with songs. But there is no need to discuss this. Modern society cannot successfully attempt socialism in anything like that form. The only force that has ever proved equal to it, a strong and definite religious faith, is lacking and is daily growing weaker. We have passed out of the socialism of the tribal state and cannot re-enter it except by a retrogression that would bring anarchy and perhaps barbarism. Our governments, as is already plain, would break down in the attempt. Instead of an intelligent award of duties and earnings, we should have a Roman distribution of Sicilian corn, and the demagogue would soon become the Imperator.319

The ideal of socialism is grand and noble; and it is, I am convinced, possible of realization; but such a state of society cannot be manufactured—it must grow. Society is an organism, not a machine. It can live only by the individual life of its parts. And in the free and natural development of all the parts will be secured the harmony of the whole. All that is necessary to social regeneration is included in the motto of those Russian patriots sometimes called Nihilists—“Land and Liberty!”

The ideal of socialism is grand and noble, and I am convinced it can be realized. But such a state of society cannot be manufactured. It must grow. Society is an organism, not a machine. It can live only by the individual life of its parts, and the free and natural development of all the parts will secure the harmony of the whole. Everything necessary for social regeneration is contained in the motto of those Russian patriots sometimes called Nihilists: “Land and Liberty!”

There is a rapidly growing feeling that the tenure of land is in some manner connected with the social distress which manifests itself in the most progressive countries; but this feeling as yet mostly shows itself in propositions which look to the more general division of landed property—in England, free trade in land, tenant right, or the equal partition of landed estates among heirs; in the United States, restrictions upon the size of individual holdings. It has been also proposed in England that the state should buy out the landlords, and in the United States that grants of money should be made to enable the settlements of colonies upon public lands. The former proposition let us pass for the present; the latter, so far as its distinctive feature is concerned, falls into the category of the measures considered in the last section. It needs no argument to show to what abuses and demoralization grants of public money or credit would lead.

A rapidly growing feeling holds that the tenure of land is somehow connected with the social distress that shows itself in the most progressive countries. But so far this feeling mostly appears in proposals for a more general division of landed property. In England these are free trade in land, tenant right, or the equal partition of landed estates among heirs. In the United States they are restrictions on the size of individual holdings. It has also been proposed in England that the state buy out the landlords, and in the United States that grants of money be made to enable colonies to settle on public lands. Let us pass over the former proposal for the present. The latter, in its distinctive feature, falls into the category of measures considered in the last section. It needs no argument to show what abuses and demoralization grants of public money or credit would lead to.

How what the English writers call “free trade in land”—the removal of duties and restrictions upon conveyances—could facilitate the division of ownership in agricultural land, I cannot see, though it might to some320 extent have that effect as regards town property. The removal of restrictions upon buying and selling would merely permit the ownership of land to assume more quickly the form to which it tends. Now, that the tendency in Great Britain is to concentration is shown by the fact that, in spite of the difficulties interposed by the cost of transfer, land ownership has been and is steadily concentrating there, and that this tendency is a general one is shown by the fact that the same process of concentration is observable in the United States. I say this unhesitatingly in regard to the United States, although statistical tables are sometimes quoted to show a different tendency. But how, in such a country as the United States, the ownership of land may be really concentrating, while census tables show rather a diminution in the average size of holdings, is readily seen. As land is brought into use, and, with the growth of population, passes from a lower to a higher or intenser use, the size of holdings tends to diminish. A small stock range would be a large farm, a small farm would be a large orchard, vineyard, nursery, or vegetable garden, and a patch of land which would be small even for these purposes would make a very large city property. Thus, the growth of population, which puts land to higher or intenser uses, tends naturally to reduce the size of holdings, by a process very marked in new countries; but with this may go on a tendency to the concentration of land ownership, which, though not revealed by tables which show the average size of holdings, is just as clearly seen. Average holdings of one acre in a city may show a much greater concentration of land ownership than average holdings of 640 acres in a newly settled township. I refer to this to show the fallacy in the deductions drawn from the tables which are frequently paraded in the United States to show that land monopoly is an evil that will cure itself. On the contrary, it is obvious that the321 proportion of land owners to the whole population is constantly decreasing.

I cannot see how what English writers call “free trade in land,” the removal of duties and restrictions on conveyances, could help divide the ownership of agricultural land, though it might have that effect to some extent on town property.320 Removing restrictions on buying and selling would merely let the ownership of land take more quickly the form it tends toward. The tendency in Great Britain is toward concentration. In spite of the obstacle of transfer costs, land ownership there has been and still is steadily concentrating. The same process is observable in the United States, which shows the tendency is general. I say this without hesitation about the United States, although statistical tables are sometimes quoted to show a different tendency. But it is easy to see how, in a country like the United States, land ownership may really be concentrating while census tables show a shrinking average size of holdings. As land is brought into use and, with the growth of population, passes from a lower to a higher or more intensive use, the size of holdings tends to shrink. A small stock range would be a large farm, and a small farm would be a large orchard, vineyard, nursery or vegetable garden. A patch of land too small even for these would make a very large city property. So the growth of population, which puts land to higher or more intensive uses, naturally tends to reduce the size of holdings, very markedly in new countries. Meanwhile a tendency to concentrate land ownership may go on, which tables of average holdings do not reveal but which is just as plain. Average holdings of one acre in a city may show much greater concentration of land ownership than average holdings of 640 acres in a newly settled township. I mention this to show the fallacy in the deductions from the tables so often paraded in the United States to show that land monopoly is an evil that will cure itself. On the contrary, it is obvious that the proportion of landowners to the whole population is constantly decreasing.321

And that there is in the United States, as there is in Great Britain, a strong tendency to the concentration of land ownership in agriculture is clearly seen. As, in England and Ireland, small farms are being thrown into larger ones, so in New England, according to the reports of the Massachusetts Bureau of Labor Statistics, is the size of farms increasing. This tendency is even more clearly noticeable in the newer States and Territories. Only a few years ago a farm of 320 acres would, under the system of agriculture prevailing in the northern parts of the Union, have anywhere been a large one, probably as much as one man could cultivate to advantage. In California now there are farms (not cattle ranges) of five, ten, twenty, forty and sixty thousand acres, while the model farm of Dakota embraces 100,000 acres. The reason is obvious. It is the application of machinery to agriculture and the general tendency to production on a large scale. The same tendency which substitutes the factory, with its army of operatives, for many independent hand-loom weavers, is beginning to exhibit itself in agriculture.

It is clear that in the United States, as in Great Britain, there is a strong tendency to concentrate land ownership in agriculture. As small farms are being thrown into larger ones in England and Ireland, so in New England, according to the reports of the Massachusetts Bureau of Labor Statistics, farms are growing in size. This tendency is even more noticeable in the newer States and Territories. Only a few years ago a farm of 320 acres would have been large anywhere in the northern parts of the Union, under the system of agriculture prevailing there, probably as much as one man could cultivate to advantage. In California now there are farms (not cattle ranges) of five, ten, twenty, forty and sixty thousand acres, and the model farm of Dakota covers 100,000 acres. The reason is obvious. Machinery has been applied to agriculture, and production on a large scale is the general tendency. The same tendency that replaces many independent hand-loom weavers with the factory and its army of operatives is beginning to show itself in agriculture.

Now, the existence of this tendency shows two things: first, that any measures which merely permit or facilitate the greater subdivision of land would be inoperative; and, second, that any measures which would compel it would have a tendency to check production. If land in large bodies can be cultivated more cheaply than land in small bodies, to restrict ownership to small bodies will reduce the aggregate production of wealth, and, in so far as such restrictions are imposed and take effect, will they tend to diminish the general productiveness of labor and capital.

The existence of this tendency shows two things. First, any measures that merely permit or ease the further subdivision of land would do nothing. Second, any measures that compelled it would tend to check production. If land in large bodies can be cultivated more cheaply than land in small bodies, restricting ownership to small bodies will reduce the total production of wealth. So far as such restrictions are imposed and take effect, they will tend to reduce the general productiveness of labor and capital.

The effort, therefore, to secure a fairer division of wealth by such restrictions is liable to the drawback of322 lessening the amount to be divided. The device is like that of the monkey, who, dividing the cheese between the cats, equalized matters by taking a bite off the biggest piece.

An effort to secure a fairer division of wealth by such restrictions therefore risks the drawback of lessening the amount to be divided.322 The device is like that of the monkey who, dividing the cheese between the cats, evened things up by taking a bite off the biggest piece.

But there is not merely this objection, which weighs against every proposition to restrict the ownership of land, with a force that increases with the efficiency of the proposed measure. There is the further and fatal objection that restriction will not secure the end which is alone worth aiming at—a fair division of the produce. It will not reduce rent, and therefore cannot increase wages. It may make the comfortable classes larger, but will not improve the condition of those in the lowest class.

But this is not the only objection. It weighs against every proposal to restrict the ownership of land, and its force grows with the effectiveness of the proposed measure. There is a further and fatal objection. Restriction will not secure the one end worth aiming at, a fair division of the produce. It will not reduce rent, and so cannot increase wages. It may enlarge the comfortable classes, but it will not improve the condition of those in the lowest class.

If what is known as the Ulster tenant right were extended to the whole of Great Britain, it would be but to carve out of the estate of the landlord an estate for the tenant. The condition of the laborer would not be a whit improved. If landlords were prohibited from asking an increase of rent from their tenants and from ejecting a tenant so long as the fixed rent was paid, the body of the producers would gain nothing. Economic rent would still increase, and would still steadily lessen the proportion of the produce going to labor and capital. The only difference would be that the tenants of the first landlords, who would become landlords in their turn, would profit by the increase.

Suppose what is known as the Ulster tenant right were extended to the whole of Great Britain. It would only carve out of the landlord’s estate an estate for the tenant, and the condition of the laborer would not be improved a whit. Suppose landlords were forbidden to ask more rent from their tenants and to evict a tenant so long as the fixed rent was paid. The body of producers would gain nothing. Economic rent would still increase and would still steadily lessen the proportion of the produce going to labor and capital. The only difference would be that the tenants of the first landlords, who would become landlords in their turn, would profit by the increase.

If by a restriction upon the amount of land any one individual might hold, by the regulation of devises and successions, or by cumulative taxation, the few thousand land holders of Great Britain should be increased by two or three million, these two or three million people would be gainers. But the rest of the population would gain nothing. They would have no more share in the advantages of land ownership than before. And if, what is manifestly impossible, a fair distribution of the land323 were made among the whole population, giving to each his equal share, and laws enacted which would interpose a barrier to the tendency to concentration by forbidding the holding by any one of more than the fixed amount, what would become of the increase of population?

Suppose a limit on the amount of land any one person could hold, or the regulation of wills and inheritance, or cumulative taxation, increased the few thousand landholders of Great Britain by two or three million. Those two or three million people would gain. But the rest of the population would gain nothing. They would have no more share in the advantages of land ownership than before.323 And suppose a fair distribution of the land were made among the whole population, giving each his equal share, which is plainly impossible. Suppose laws then barred the tendency to concentration by forbidding anyone to hold more than the fixed amount. What would become of the increase of population?

Just what may be accomplished by the greater division of land may be seen in those districts of France and Belgium where minute division prevails. That such a division of land is on the whole much better, and that it gives a far more stable basis to the state than that which prevails in England, there can be no doubt. But that it does not make wages any higher or improve the condition of the class who have only their labor, is equally clear. These French and Belgian peasants practice a rigid economy unknown to any of the English-speaking peoples. And if such striking symptoms of the poverty and distress of the lowest class are not apparent as on the other side of the channel, it must, I think, be attributed, not only to this fact, but to another fact, which accounts for the continuance of the minute division of the land—that material progress has not been so rapid.

We can see just what greater division of land may accomplish in those districts of France and Belgium where minute division prevails. There is no doubt that such a division of land is on the whole much better and gives the state a far more stable basis than the one that prevails in England. But it is equally clear that it does not make wages any higher or improve the condition of the class who have only their labor. These French and Belgian peasants practice a rigid economy unknown to any of the English-speaking peoples. Such striking symptoms of the poverty and distress of the lowest class are not apparent there as across the channel. I think this is due not only to that economy but to another fact, which also accounts for the continuance of the minute division of the land. Material progress has not been so rapid.

Neither has population increased with the same rapidity (on the contrary it has been nearly stationary), nor have improvements in the modes of production been so great. Nevertheless, M. de Laveleye, all of whose prepossessions are in favor of small holdings, and whose testimony will therefore carry more weight than that of English observers, who may be supposed to harbor a prejudice for the system of their own country, states in his paper on the Land Systems of Belgium and Holland, printed by the Cobden Club, that the condition of the laborer is worse under this system of the minute division of land than it is in England; while the tenant farmers—for tenancy largely prevails even where the morcellment is greatest—are rack-rented with a mercilessness unknown in England, and even in Ireland, and the324 franchise “so far from raising them in the social scale, is but a source of mortification and humiliation to them, for they are forced to vote according to the dictates of the landlord instead of following the dictates of their own inclination and convictions.”

Population has not increased as rapidly either (on the contrary, it has been nearly stationary), and improvements in the modes of production have not been so great. Even so, M. de Laveleye, the Belgian economist, is wholly in favor of small holdings. His testimony therefore carries more weight than that of English observers, who may be supposed to prefer their own country’s system. In his paper on the Land Systems of Belgium and Holland, printed by the Cobden Club, he says the condition of the laborer is worse under this system of minute division of land than in England.324 The tenant farmers are rack-rented with a mercilessness unknown in England and even in Ireland (tenancy largely prevails even where the morcellment is greatest). And the vote, he says, “so far from raising them in the social scale, is only a source of mortification and humiliation to them, for they are forced to vote as the landlord dictates instead of following their own inclination and convictions.”

But while the subdivision of land can thus do nothing to cure the evils of land monopoly, while it can have no effect in raising wages or in improving the condition of the lowest classes, its tendency is to prevent the adoption or even advocacy of more thorough-going measures, and to strengthen the existing unjust system by interesting a larger number in its maintenance. M. de Laveleye, in concluding the paper from which I have quoted, urges the greater division of land as the surest means of securing the great land owners of England from something far more radical. Although in the districts where land is so minutely divided, the condition of the laborer is, he states, the worst in Europe and the renting farmer is much more ground down by his landlord than the Irish tenant, yet “feelings hostile to social order,” M. de Laveleye goes on to say, “do not manifest themselves,” because—

So the subdivision of land can do nothing to cure the evils of land monopoly, and can have no effect in raising wages or improving the condition of the lowest classes. Its tendency is instead to prevent the adoption or even advocacy of more thorough-going measures, and to strengthen the existing unjust system by giving a larger number of people an interest in maintaining it. M. de Laveleye, concluding the paper I have quoted, urges greater division of land as the surest way to secure the great landowners of England against something far more radical. He says that in the districts where land is so minutely divided, the condition of the laborer is the worst in Europe, and the renting farmer is ground down much harder by his landlord than the Irish tenant. Yet “feelings hostile to social order,” he goes on to say, “do not manifest themselves,” because:

“The tenant, although ground down by the constant rise of rents, lives among his equals, peasants like himself who have tenants whom they use just as the large land holder does his. His father, his brother, perhaps the man himself, possesses something like an acre of land, which he lets at as high a rent as he can get. In the public house peasant proprietors will boast of the high rents they get for their lands, just as they might boast of having sold their pigs or potatoes very dear. Letting at as high a rent as possible comes thus to seem to him to be quite a matter of course, and he never dreams of finding fault with either the land owners as a class or with property in land. His mind is not likely to dwell on the notion of a caste of domineering landlords, of “bloodthirsty tyrants,” fattening on the sweat of impoverished tenants and doing no work themselves; for those who drive the hardest bargains are not the great land owners but his own fellows. Thus, the distribution of a number of small properties among the peasantry forms a kind of rampart and safe325guard for the holders of large estates, and peasant property may without exaggeration be called the lightning conductor that averts from society dangers which might otherwise lead to violent catastrophes.

“The concentration of land in large estates among a small number of families is a sort of provocation of leveling legislation. The position of England, so enviable in many respects, seems to me to be in this respect full of danger for the future.”

“The tenant, though ground down by constantly rising rents, lives among his equals, peasants like himself who have tenants of their own whom they treat just as the large landholder treats his. His father, his brother, perhaps the man himself, owns something like an acre of land, which he lets at as high a rent as he can get. In the public house, peasant proprietors boast of the high rents they get for their land, just as they might boast of selling their pigs or potatoes very dear. Letting at as high a rent as possible comes to seem a matter of course to him. He never dreams of finding fault with landowners as a class or with property in land. He is not likely to dwell on the idea of a caste of domineering landlords, ‘bloodthirsty tyrants,’ fattening on the sweat of impoverished tenants and doing no work themselves. The ones who drive the hardest bargains are not the great landowners but his own fellows.325 So the spread of many small properties among the peasantry forms a kind of rampart and safeguard for the holders of large estates. Peasant property may without exaggeration be called the lightning conductor that turns away dangers from society which might otherwise lead to violent catastrophes. The concentration of land in large estates among a small number of families is a sort of provocation to leveling legislation. England’s position, so enviable in many respects, seems to me in this respect full of danger for the future.”

To me, for the very same reason that M. de Laveleye expresses, the position of England seems full of hope.

To me, for the very reason M. de Laveleye gives, the position of England seems full of hope.

Let us abandon all attempt to get rid of the evils of land monopoly by restricting land ownership. An equal distribution of land is impossible, and anything short of that would be only a mitigation, not a cure, and a mitigation that would prevent the adoption of a cure. Nor is any remedy worth considering that does not fall in with the natural direction of social development, and swim, so to speak, with the current of the times. That concentration is the order of development there can be no mistaking—the concentration of people in large cities, the concentration of handicrafts in large factories, the concentration of transportation by railroad and steamship lines, and of agricultural operations in large fields. The most trivial businesses are being concentrated in the same way—errands are run and carpet sacks are carried by corporations. All the currents of the time run to concentration. To resist it successfully we must throttle steam and discharge electricity from human service.

Let us give up every attempt to get rid of the evils of land monopoly by restricting land ownership. An equal distribution of land is impossible, and anything short of that would only mitigate and not cure, and the mitigation would prevent the adoption of a cure. No remedy is worth considering unless it falls in with the natural direction of social development and swims, so to speak, with the current of the times. Concentration is plainly the order of development: people concentrating in large cities, handicrafts in large factories, transportation in railroad and steamship lines, and agricultural operations in large fields. The most trivial businesses are being concentrated in the same way, and corporations now run errands and carry carpet sacks. All the currents of the time run toward concentration. To resist it successfully we would have to throttle steam and discharge electricity from human service.