Chapter I The Injustice of Private Property in Land

When it is proposed to abolish private property in land the first question that will arise is that of justice. Though often warped by habit, superstition, and selfishness into the most distorted forms, the sentiment of justice is yet fundamental to the human mind, and whatever dispute arouses the passions of men, the conflict is sure to rage, not so much as to the question “Is it wise?” as to the question “Is it right?”

When someone proposes to abolish private property in land, the first question is one of justice. Habit, superstition and selfishness often warp the sense of justice into distorted forms, but it remains basic to the human mind. Whatever dispute stirs people's passions, the fight is sure to turn less on “Is it wise?” than on “Is it right?”

This tendency of popular discussions to take an ethical form has a cause. It springs from a law of the human mind; it rests upon a vague and instinctive recognition of what is probably the deepest truth we can grasp. That alone is wise which is just; that alone is enduring which is right. In the narrow scale of individual actions and individual life this truth may be often obscured, but in the wider field of national life it everywhere stands out.

This habit of giving popular arguments an ethical form has a cause. It comes from a law of the human mind, and it rests on a vague, instinctive recognition of what is probably the deepest truth we can grasp. Only what is just is wise, and only what is right will last. In the narrow range of individual actions and lives this truth is often hidden. In the wider field of national life it stands out everywhere.

I bow to this arbitrament, and accept this test. If our inquiry into the cause which makes low wages and pauperism the accompaniments of material progress has led us to a correct conclusion, it will bear translation from terms of political economy into terms of ethics, and as the source of social evils show a wrong. If it will not do this, it is disproved. If it will do this, it is proved by the final decision. If private property in land be just, then is the remedy I propose a false one; if, on the contrary, private property in land be unjust, then is this remedy the true one.

I bow to this judgment and accept the test. Our inquiry asked why low wages and dependence on public relief accompany material progress. If we reached the right conclusion, it will translate from the terms of economics into the terms of ethics and show a wrong as the source of social evils. If it cannot, it is disproved. If it can, this final decision proves it. If private property in land is just, my remedy is false. If private property in land is unjust, my remedy is the true one.

What constitutes the rightful basis of property? What is it that enables a man justly to say of a thing, “It is mine?” From what springs the sentiment which acknowledges his exclusive right as against all the world? Is it not, primarily, the right of a man to himself to the use of his own powers, to the enjoyment of the fruits of his own exertions? Is it not this individual right, which springs from and is testified to by the natural facts of individual organization—the fact that each particular pair of hands obey a particular brain and are related to a particular stomach; the fact that each man is a definite, coherent, independent whole—which alone justifies individual ownership? As a man belongs to himself, so his labor when put in concrete form belongs to him.

What is the rightful basis of property? What lets a man say of a thing, “It is mine,” and what is the feeling that acknowledges his exclusive right against all the world? Is it not, first of all, a man's right to himself, to use his own powers and enjoy the fruits of his own exertions? This individual right comes from the plain facts of individual organization, and those facts testify to it. Each pair of hands obeys a particular brain and serves a particular stomach, and each man is a definite, coherent, independent whole. Is it not this right, and only this, that justifies individual ownership? As a man belongs to himself, so his labor, once it takes concrete form, belongs to him.

And for this reason, that which a man makes or produces is his own, as against all the world—to enjoy or to destroy, to use, to exchange, or to give. No one else can rightfully claim it, and his exclusive right to it involves no wrong to any one else. Thus there is to everything produced by human exertion a clear and indisputable title to exclusive possession and enjoyment, which is perfectly consistent with justice, as it descends from the original producer, in whom it vested by natural law. The pen with which I am writing is justly mine. No other human being can rightfully lay claim to it, for in me is the title of the producers who made it. It has become mine, because transferred to me by the stationer, to whom it was transferred by the importer, who obtained the exclusive right to it by transfer from the manufacturer, in whom, by the same process of purchase, vested the rights of those who dug the material from the ground and shaped it into a pen. Thus, my exclusive right of ownership in the pen springs from the natural right of the individual to the use of his own faculties.

For this reason what a man makes or produces is his own against all the world, to enjoy or destroy, to use, exchange or give away. No one else can rightfully claim it, and his exclusive right to it wrongs no one. So everything produced by human exertion carries a clear and indisputable title to exclusive possession and enjoyment. That title is perfectly consistent with justice, because it descends from the original producer, in whom natural law vested it. The pen I am writing with is justly mine. No one else can rightfully claim it, because in me lies the title of the producers who made it. It became mine by transfer from the stationer, who got it from the importer, who got the exclusive right from the manufacturer. In the manufacturer, by the same process of purchase, vested the rights of those who dug the material from the ground and shaped it into a pen. So my exclusive ownership of the pen springs from the natural right of the individual to use his own faculties.

Now, this is not only the original source from which333 all ideas of exclusive ownership arise—as is evident from the natural tendency of the mind to revert to it when the idea of exclusive ownership is questioned, and the manner in which social relations develop—but it is necessarily the only source. There can be to the ownership of anything no rightful title which is not derived from the title of the producer and does not rest upon the natural right of the man to himself. There can be no other rightful title, because (1st) there is no other natural right from which any other title can be derived, and (2d) because the recognition of any other title is inconsistent with and destructive of this.

This is not only the original source of333 all ideas of exclusive ownership. The mind naturally returns to it whenever exclusive ownership is questioned, and social relations develop along its lines. It is also necessarily the only source. No rightful title to anything can exist unless it derives from the producer's title and rests on the natural right of the man to himself. There can be no other, for two reasons. (1) No other natural right exists from which any other title could derive. (2) Recognizing any other title is inconsistent with this right and destroys it.

For (1st) what other right exists from which the right to the exclusive possession of anything can be derived, save the right of a man to himself? With what other power is man by nature clothed, save the power of exerting his own faculties? How can he in any other way act upon or affect material things or other men? Paralyze the motor nerves, and your man has no more external influence or power than a log or stone. From what else, then, can the right of possessing and controlling things be derived? If it spring not from man himself, from what can it spring? Nature acknowledges no ownership or control in man save as the result of exertion. In no other way can her treasures be drawn forth, her powers directed, or her forces utilized or controlled. She makes no discriminations among men, but is to all absolutely impartial. She knows no distinction between master and slave, king and subject, saint and sinner. All men to her stand upon an equal footing and have equal rights. She recognizes no claim but that of labor, and recognizes that without respect to the claimant. If a pirate spread his sails, the wind will fill them as well as it will fill those of a peaceful merchantman or missionary bark; if a king and a common man be thrown overboard, neither can keep his head above water except by swim334ming; birds will not come to be shot by the proprietor of the soil any quicker than they will come to be shot by the poacher; fish will bite or will not bite at a hook in utter disregard as to whether it is offered them by a good little boy who goes to Sunday-school, or a bad little boy who plays truant; grain will grow only as the ground is prepared and the seed is sown; it is only at the call of labor that ore can be raised from the mine; the sun shines and the rain falls, alike upon just and unjust. The laws of nature are the decrees of the Creator. There is written in them no recognition of any right save that of labor; and in them is written broadly and clearly the equal right of all men to the use and enjoyment of nature; to apply to her by their exertions, and to receive and possess her reward. Hence, as nature gives only to labor, the exertion of labor in production is the only title to exclusive possession.

First (point 1): what other right exists from which a right to exclusive possession of anything could derive, except a man's right to himself? What other power has nature given him, except the power to exert his own faculties? How else can he act on material things or on other men? Paralyze the motor nerves and your man has no more outward influence than a log or a stone. From what else, then, can the right to possess and control things come? If it does not spring from man himself, where can it spring from? Nature acknowledges no ownership or control in man except as the result of exertion. Only by exertion can her treasures be drawn out, her powers directed, her forces used. She makes no discrimination among men and is absolutely impartial to all. She knows no distinction between master and slave, king and subject, saint and sinner. Every man stands to her on an equal footing, with equal rights. She recognizes no claim but that of labor, and she recognizes it without regard to who makes it. If a pirate spreads his sails, the wind fills them as readily as it fills those of a peaceful merchantman or a missionary ship. If a king and a common man are thrown overboard, neither can keep his head above water except by swimming334. Birds come no quicker to be shot by the owner of the soil than by the poacher. Fish bite or refuse a hook with no regard for whether a good little boy from Sunday school or a bad one playing truant offers it. Grain grows only where the ground is prepared and the seed sown. Ore comes out of the mine only at the call of labor. The sun shines and the rain falls alike on the just and the unjust. The laws of nature are the decrees of the Creator, and they recognize no right except that of labor. They also state, broadly and clearly, the equal right of all men to use and enjoy nature. Men may apply themselves to her by their exertions, and receive and keep her reward. Since nature gives only to labor, exerting labor in production is the only title to exclusive possession.

2d. This right of ownership that springs from labor excludes the possibility of any other right of ownership. If a man be rightfully entitled to the produce of his labor, then no one can be rightfully entitled to the ownership of anything which is not the produce of his labor, or the labor of some one else from whom the right has passed to him. If production give to the producer the right to exclusive possession and enjoyment, there can rightfully be no exclusive possession and enjoyment of anything not the production of labor, and the recognition of private property in land is a wrong. For the right to the produce of labor cannot be enjoyed without the right to the free use of the opportunities offered by nature, and to admit the right of property in these is to deny the right of property in the produce of labor. When non-producers can claim as rent a portion of the wealth created by producers, the right of the producers to the fruits of their labor is to that extent denied.

Second (point 2): the right of ownership that springs from labor rules out every other right of ownership. If a man is rightfully entitled to the produce of his labor, no one can rightfully own anything that is not the produce of his labor, or of the labor of someone from whom the right passed to him. If production gives the producer exclusive possession and enjoyment, nothing that labor did not produce can rightfully be held exclusively. So recognizing private property in land is a wrong. The right to the produce of labor cannot be enjoyed without the right to free use of the opportunities nature offers. To admit property in those opportunities is to deny property in the produce of labor. When non-producers can claim as rent a portion of the wealth that producers create, the producers' right to the fruits of their labor is denied to that extent.

There is no escape from this position. To affirm that335 a man can rightfully claim exclusive ownership in his own labor when embodied in material things, is to deny that any one can rightfully claim exclusive ownership in land. To affirm the rightfulness of property in land, is to affirm a claim which has no warrant in nature, as against a claim founded in the organization of man and the laws of the material universe.

There is no escape from this position. To affirm that335 a man can rightfully own his labor once it is embodied in material things is to deny that anyone can rightfully own land. To affirm property in land is to affirm a claim with no warrant in nature, against a claim founded in the organization of man and the laws of the material universe.

What most prevents the realization of the injustice of private property in land is the habit of including all the things that are made the subject of ownership in one category, as property, or, if any distinction is made, drawing the line, according to the unphilosophical distinction of the lawyers, between personal property and real estate, or things movable and things immovable. The real and natural distinction is between things which are the produce of labor and things which are the gratuitous offerings of nature; or, to adopt the terms of political economy, between wealth and land.

What most prevents people from seeing the injustice of private property in land is the habit of lumping everything that can be owned into one category, property. When a distinction is drawn at all, it follows the lawyers' unphilosophical line between personal property and real estate, or between movable and immovable things. The real, natural distinction is between things that are the produce of labor and things that are the free gifts of nature. In the terms of economics, it is the distinction between wealth and land.

These two classes of things are in essence and relations widely different, and to class them together as property is to confuse all thought when we come to consider the justice or the injustice, the right or the wrong of property.

These two classes of things differ widely in their essence and their relations. To class them together as property confuses all thought when we come to ask whether property is just or unjust, right or wrong.

A house and the lot on which it stands are alike property, as being the subject of ownership, and are alike classed by the lawyers as real estate. Yet in nature and relations they differ widely. The one is produced by human labor, and belongs to the class in political economy styled wealth. The other is a part of nature, and belongs to the class in political economy styled land.

A house and the lot it stands on are both property, since both can be owned, and the lawyers class both as real estate. Yet they differ widely in nature and relations. The house is produced by human labor and belongs to the class that economics calls wealth. The lot is part of nature and belongs to the class that economics calls land.

The essential character of the one class of things is that they embody labor, are brought into being by human exertion, their existence or non-existence, their increase or diminution, depending on man. The essential character of the other class of things is that they do not embody labor, and exist irrespective of human exertion336 and irrespective of man; they are the field or environment in which man finds himself; the storehouse from which his needs must be supplied, the raw material upon which, and the forces with which alone his labor can act.

The essential character of the first class is that it embodies labor. Human exertion brings these things into being, and their existence or absence, their increase or decrease, depends on man. The essential character of the second class is that it embodies no labor and exists regardless of human exertion336 and of man himself. It is the field or environment in which man finds himself. It is the storehouse that must supply his needs, the raw material his labor can act on, and the source of the forces his labor can use.

The moment this distinction is realized, that moment is it seen that the sanction which natural justice gives to one species of property is denied to the other; that the rightfulness which attaches to individual property in the produce of labor implies the wrongfulness of individual property in land; that, whereas the recognition of the one places all men upon equal terms, securing to each the due reward of his labor, the recognition of the other is the denial of the equal rights of men, permitting those who do not labor to take the natural reward of those who do.

The moment we see this distinction, we see that natural justice sanctions one kind of property and denies its sanction to the other. The rightfulness of individual property in the produce of labor implies the wrongfulness of individual property in land. Recognizing the first puts all men on equal terms and secures to each the due reward of his labor. Recognizing the second denies the equal rights of men and lets those who do not labor take the natural reward of those who do.

Whatever may be said for the institution of private property in land, it is therefore plain that it cannot be defended on the score of justice.

Whatever else may be said for private property in land, it plainly cannot be defended on the ground of justice.

The equal right of all men to the use of land is as clear as their equal right to breathe the air—it is a right proclaimed by the fact of their existence. For we cannot suppose that some men have a right to be in this world and others no right.

The equal right of all men to use land is as clear as their equal right to breathe air. Their very existence proclaims it, for we cannot suppose that some men have a right to be in this world and others none.

If we are all here by the equal permission of the Creator, we are all here with an equal title to the enjoyment of his bounty—with an equal right to the use of all that nature so impartially offers.46 This is a right which is337 natural and inalienable; it is a right which vests in every human being as he enters the world, and which during his continuance in the world can be limited only by the equal rights of others. There is in nature no such thing as a fee simple in land. There is on earth no power which can rightfully make a grant of exclusive ownership in land. If all existing men were to unite to grant away their equal rights, they could not grant away the right of those who follow them. For what are we but tenants for a day? Have we made the earth, that we should determine the rights of those who after us shall tenant it in their turn? The Almighty, who created the earth for man and man for the earth, has entailed it upon all the generations of the children of men by a decree written upon the constitution of all things—a decree which no human action can bar and no prescription determine. Let the parchments be ever so many, or possession ever so long, natural justice can recognize no right in one man to the possession and enjoyment of land that is not equally the right of all his fellows. Though his titles have been acquiesced in by generation after generation, to the landed estates of the Duke of Westminster the poorest child that is born in London to-day338 has as much right as has his eldest son.47 Though the sovereign people of the State of New York consent to the lauded possessions of the Astors, the puniest infant that comes wailing into the world in the squalidest room of the most miserable tenement house, becomes at that moment seized of an equal right with the millionaires. And it is robbed if the right is denied.

If we are all here by the Creator's equal permission, we are all here with an equal title to enjoy his bounty, with an equal right to use everything nature so impartially offers.46 This right is337 natural and inalienable. It vests in every human being on entering the world, and for as long as he lives only the equal rights of others can limit it. In nature there is no such thing as a fee simple in land. No power on earth can rightfully grant exclusive ownership of land. If all living men united to give away their equal rights, they could not give away the rights of those who come after them. What are we but tenants for a day? Did we make the earth, that we should decide the rights of those who will tenant it after us? The Almighty, who created the earth for man and man for the earth, has entailed it on all generations of the children of men. His decree is written into the constitution of all things. No human action can bar it and no prescription can set it aside. However many the parchments or however long the possession, natural justice recognizes no right in one man to possess and enjoy land that is not equally the right of all his fellows. Generation after generation may have accepted his titles. Still, in the landed estates of the Duke of Westminster, the poorest child born in London today338 has as much right as the Duke's eldest son.47 The sovereign people of the State of New York may consent to the land holdings of the Astors. Still, the puniest infant wailing into the world in the squalidest room of the most miserable tenement house is at that moment vested with a right equal to the millionaires'. And it is robbed if the right is denied.

Our previous conclusions, irresistible in themselves, thus stand approved by the highest and final test. Translated from terms of political economy into terms of ethics they show a wrong as the source of the evils which increase as material progress goes on.

Our earlier conclusions were irresistible in themselves. Now they stand approved by the highest and final test. Translated from the terms of economics into the terms of ethics, they show a wrong as the source of the evils that grow as material progress goes on.

The masses of men, who in the midst of abundance suffer want; who, clothed with political freedom, are condemned to the wages of slavery; to whose toil labor-saving inventions bring no relief, but rather seem to rob them of a privilege, instinctively feel that “there is something wrong.” And they are right.

The masses of men suffer want in the midst of abundance. They have political freedom and are condemned to the wages of slavery. Labor-saving inventions bring them no relief and seem rather to rob them of a privilege. They feel instinctively that “there is something wrong.” And they are right.

The wide-spreading social evils which everywhere oppress men amid an advancing civilization spring from a great primary wrong—the appropriation, as the exclusive property of some men, of the land on which and from which all must live. From this fundamental injustice flow all the injustices which distort and endanger modern development, which condemn the producer of wealth to339 poverty and pamper the non-producer in luxury, which rear the tenement house with the palace, plant the brothel behind the church, and compel us to build prisons as we open new schools.

The social evils that spread everywhere and oppress men amid advancing civilization spring from one great primary wrong. That wrong is the appropriation, as the exclusive property of some men, of the land on which and from which all must live. From this fundamental injustice flow all the injustices that distort and endanger modern development. They condemn the producer of wealth to339 poverty and pamper the non-producer in luxury. They build the tenement house beside the palace, plant the brothel behind the church, and force us to build prisons as we open new schools.

There is nothing strange or inexplicable in the phenomena that are now perplexing the world. It is not that material progress is not in itself a good; it is not that nature has called into being children for whom she has failed to provide; it is not that the Creator has left on natural laws a taint of injustice at which even the human mind revolts, that material progress brings such bitter fruits. That amid our highest civilization men faint and die with want is not due to the niggardliness of nature, but to the injustice of man. Vice and misery, poverty and pauperism, are not the legitimate results of increase of population and industrial development; they only follow increase of population and industrial development because land is treated as private property—they are the direct and necessary results of the violation of the supreme law of justice, involved in giving to some men the exclusive possession of that which nature provides for all men.

There is nothing strange or inexplicable in the phenomena that now perplex the world. Material progress is not in itself bad. Nature has not called into being children for whom she has failed to provide. The Creator has not left on natural laws a taint of injustice, at which even the human mind revolts, that makes material progress bring such bitter fruits. That men faint and die of want amid our highest civilization is due not to the niggardliness of nature but to the injustice of man. Vice and misery, poverty and dependence on public relief are not the legitimate results of increasing population and industrial development. They follow increasing population and industrial development only because land is treated as private property. They are the direct and necessary results of violating the supreme law of justice, by giving some men the exclusive possession of what nature provides for all men.

The recognition of individual proprietorship of land is the denial of the natural rights of other individuals—it is a wrong which must show itself in the inequitable division of wealth. For as labor cannot produce without the use of land, the denial of the equal right to the use of land is necessarily the denial of the right of labor to its own produce. If one man can command the land upon which others must labor, he can appropriate the produce of their labor as the price of his permission to labor. The fundamental law of nature, that her enjoyment by man shall be consequent upon his exertion, is thus violated. The one receives without producing; the others produce without receiving. The one is unjustly enriched; the others are robbed. To this fundamental wrong we340 have traced the unjust distribution of wealth which is separating modern society into the very rich and the very poor. It is the continuous increase of rent—the price that labor is compelled to pay for the use of land, which strips the many of the wealth they justly earn, to pile it up in the hands of the few, who do nothing to earn it.

Recognizing individual ownership of land denies the natural rights of other individuals. It is a wrong that must show itself in an unjust division of wealth. Labor cannot produce without land, so denying the equal right to use land necessarily denies the right of labor to its own produce. If one man can command the land on which others must labor, he can take the produce of their labor as the price of his permission to labor. This violates the fundamental law of nature, that man's enjoyment of her shall follow his exertion. One receives without producing, and the others produce without receiving. The one is unjustly enriched and the others are robbed. We have traced to this fundamental wrong340 the unjust distribution of wealth that is splitting modern society into the very rich and the very poor. Rent keeps increasing. It is the price labor is forced to pay for the use of land. It strips the many of the wealth they justly earn and piles it up in the hands of the few, who do nothing to earn it.

Why should they who suffer from this injustice hesitate for one moment to sweep it away? Who are the land holders that they should thus be permitted to reap where they have not sown?

Why should those who suffer from this injustice hesitate for a moment to sweep it away? Who are the land holders, that they should be allowed to reap where they have not sown?

Consider for a moment the utter absurdity of the titles by which we permit to be gravely passed from John Doe to Richard Roe the right exclusively to possess the earth, giving absolute dominion as against all others. In California our land titles go back to the Supreme Government of Mexico, who took from the Spanish King, who took from the Pope, when he by a stroke of the pen divided lands yet to be discovered between the Spanish or Portuguese—or if you please they rest upon conquest. In the Eastern States they go back to treaties with Indians and grants from English Kings; in Louisiana to the Government of France; in Florida to the Government of Spain; while in England they go back to the Norman conquerors. Everywhere, not to a right which obliges, but to a force which compels. And when a title rests but on force, no complaint can be made when force annuls it. Whenever the people, having the power, choose to annul those titles, no objection can be made in the name of justice. There have existed men who had the power to hold or to give exclusive possession of portions of the earth’s surface, but when and where did there exist the human being who had the right?

Consider the utter absurdity of the titles by which we solemnly let the right to possess the earth exclusively, with absolute dominion against all others, pass from John Doe to Richard Roe. In California our land titles go back to the Supreme Government of Mexico, which took from the Spanish King, who took from the Pope. The Pope, by a stroke of the pen, divided lands yet to be discovered between Spain and Portugal. Or, if you prefer, the titles rest on conquest. In the Eastern States they go back to treaties with Indians and grants from English Kings. In Louisiana they go back to the Government of France, in Florida to the Government of Spain, and in England to the Norman conquerors. Everywhere they go back not to a right that obliges but to a force that compels. When a title rests only on force, no one can complain when force annuls it. Whenever the people have the power and choose to annul those titles, no one can object in the name of justice. There have been men with the power to hold or give exclusive possession of portions of the earth's surface. But when and where did there exist a human being with the right?

The right to exclusive ownership of anything of human production is clear. No matter how many the hands through which it has passed, there was, at the beginning of the line, human labor—some one who, having procured341 or produced it by his exertions, had to it a clear title as against all the rest of mankind, and which could justly pass from one to another by sale or gift. But at the end of what string of conveyances or grants can be shown or supposed a like title to any part of the material universe? To improvements such an original title can be shown; but it is a title only to the improvements, and not to the land itself. If I clear a forest, drain a swamp, or fill a morass, all I can justly claim is the value given by these exertions. They give me no right to the land itself, no claim other than to my equal share with every other member of the community in the value which is added to it by the growth of the community.

The right to exclusive ownership of anything of human production is clear. No matter how many hands it has passed through, human labor stood at the beginning of the line. Someone procured341 or produced it by his exertions and had a clear title to it against the rest of mankind. That title could justly pass from one person to another by sale or gift. But at the end of what string of conveyances or grants can anyone show a like title to any part of the material universe? To improvements such an original title can be shown. But it is a title only to the improvements, not to the land itself. If I clear a forest, drain a swamp or fill a morass, all I can justly claim is the value those exertions gave. They give me no right to the land itself. I can claim only my equal share, with every other member of the community, in the value the community's growth adds to it.

But it will be said: There are improvements which in time become indistinguishable from the land itself! Very well; then the title to the improvements becomes blended with the title to the land; the individual right is lost in the common right. It is the greater that swallows up the less, not the less that swallows up the greater. Nature does not proceed from man, but man from nature, and it is into the bosom of nature that he and all his works must return again.

But it will be said that some improvements in time become indistinguishable from the land itself. Very well. Then the title to the improvements blends with the title to the land, and the individual right is lost in the common right. The greater swallows up the less, not the less the greater. Nature does not proceed from man, but man from nature, and it is into the bosom of nature that he and all his works must return.

Yet, it will be said: As every man has a right to the use and enjoyment of nature, the man who is using land must be permitted the exclusive right to its use in order that he may get the full benefit of his labor. But there is no difficulty in determining where the individual right ends and the common right begins. A delicate and exact test is supplied by value, and with its aid there is no difficulty, no matter how dense population may become, in determining and securing the exact rights of each, the equal rights of all. The value of land, as we have seen, is the price of monopoly. It is not the absolute, but the relative, capability of land that determines its value. No matter what may be its intrinsic qualities, land that is no better than other land which may be had for the using342 can have no value. And the value of land always measures the difference between it and the best land that may be had for the using. Thus, the value of land expresses in exact and tangible form the right of the community in land held by an individual; and rent expresses the exact amount which the individual should pay to the community to satisfy the equal rights of all other members of the community. Thus, if we concede to priority of possession the undisturbed use of land, confiscating rent for the benefit of the community, we reconcile the fixity of tenure which is necessary for improvement with a full and complete recognition of the equal rights of all to the use of land.

Yet it will be said that every man has a right to use nature, so the man using land must have the exclusive right to it in order to get the full benefit of his labor. But it is not hard to tell where the individual right ends and the common right begins. Value supplies a delicate and exact test. With its help we can secure the exact rights of each and the equal rights of all, however dense population becomes. The value of land, as we have seen, is the price of monopoly. What determines it is not the absolute but the relative capability of land. Whatever its intrinsic qualities, land no better than other land available for the using342 can have no value. And the value of land always measures the difference between it and the best land available for the using. So the value of land expresses, in exact and tangible form, the community's right in land held by an individual. Rent expresses the exact amount the individual should pay the community to satisfy the equal rights of all its other members. So we can let priority of possession carry the undisturbed use of land, and confiscate rent for the benefit of the community. That reconciles the fixity of tenure that improvement needs with full recognition of the equal rights of all to use land.

As for the deduction of a complete and exclusive individual right to land from priority of occupation, that is, if possible, the most absurd ground on which land ownership can be defended. Priority of occupation give exclusive and perpetual title to the surface of a globe on which, in the order of nature, countless generations succeed each other! Had the men of the last generation any better right to the use of this world than we of this? or the men of a hundred years ago? or of a thousand years ago? Had the mound-builders, or the cave-dwellers, the contemporaries of the mastodon and the three-toed horse, or the generations still further back, who, in dim æons that we can think of only as geologic periods, followed each other on the earth we now tenant for our little day?

To derive a complete and exclusive individual right to land from priority of occupation is, if anything, the most absurd ground on which land ownership can be defended. Priority of occupation is supposed to give exclusive and perpetual title to the surface of a globe on which, in the order of nature, countless generations succeed each other. Did the men of the last generation have a better right to use this world than we have? Or the men of a hundred years ago, or of a thousand? Or the mound-builders, or the cave-dwellers, the contemporaries of the mastodon and the three-toed horse? Or the generations further back still, who followed each other in dim ages we can think of only as geologic periods?

Has the first comer at a banquet the right to turn back all the chairs and claim that none of the other guests shall partake of the food provided, except as they make terms with him? Does the first man who presents a ticket at the door of a theater, and passes in, acquire by his priority the right to shut the doors and have the performance go on for him alone? Does the first passenger who enters a railroad car obtain the right to scatter his343 baggage over all the seats and compel the passengers who come in after him to stand up?

Does the first comer at a banquet have the right to turn back all the chairs and say that no other guest may eat except on his terms? Does the first man to present a ticket at a theater door acquire, by his priority, the right to shut the doors and have the performance go on for him alone? Does the first passenger who enters a railroad car obtain the right to scatter his343 baggage over all the seats and force later passengers to stand?

The cases are perfectly analogous. We arrive and we depart, guests at a banquet continually spread, spectators and participants in an entertainment where there is room for all who come; passengers from station to station, on an orb that whirls through space—our rights to take and possess cannot be exclusive; they must be bounded everywhere by the equal rights of others. Just as the passenger in a railroad car may spread himself and his baggage over as many seats as he pleases, until other passengers come in, so may a settler take and use as much land as he chooses, until it is needed by others—a fact which is shown by the land acquiring a value—when his right must be curtailed by the equal rights of the others, and no priority of appropriation can give a right which will bar these equal rights of others. If this were not the case, then by priority of appropriation one man could acquire and could transmit to whom he pleased, not merely the exclusive right to 160 acres, or to 640 acres, but to a whole township, a whole State, a whole continent.

The cases are perfectly analogous. We arrive and we depart. We are guests at a banquet that is continually spread. We are spectators and participants in an entertainment with room for all who come. We are passengers from station to station on a globe whirling through space. Our rights to take and possess cannot be exclusive. The equal rights of others must bound them everywhere. A passenger in a railroad car may spread himself and his baggage over as many seats as he pleases until other passengers come in. In the same way a settler may use as much land as he chooses until others need it, which the land shows by acquiring a value. Then his right must be curtailed by the equal rights of the others. No priority of appropriation can give a right that bars them. If it could, one man could acquire, and pass to whomever he pleased, not merely the exclusive right to 160 acres or 640 acres but to a whole township, a whole State, a whole continent.

And to this manifest absurdity does the recognition of individual right to land come when carried to its ultimate—that any one human being, could he concentrate in himself the individual rights to the land of any country, could expel therefrom all the rest of its inhabitants; and could he thus concentrate the individual rights to the whole surface of the globe, he alone of all the teeming population of the earth would have the right to live.

This is the manifest absurdity to which recognizing individual right to land comes when carried to its end. Any one human being who could concentrate in himself the individual rights to the land of a country could expel all the rest of its inhabitants. If he could concentrate the individual rights to the whole surface of the globe, he alone of all the teeming population of the earth would have the right to live.

And what upon this supposition would occur is, upon a smaller scale, realized in actual fact. The territorial lords of Great Britain, to whom grants of land have given the “white parasols and elephants mad with pride,” have over and over again expelled from large districts the native population, whose ancestors had lived on the land344 from immemorial times—driven them off to emigrate, to become paupers, or to starve. And on uncultivated tracts of land in the new State of California may be seen the blackened chimneys of homes from which settlers have been driven by force of laws which ignore natural right, and great stretches of land which might be populous are desolate, because the recognition of exclusive ownership has put it in the power of one human creature to forbid his fellows from using it. The comparative handful of proprietors who own the surface of the British Islands would be doing only what English law gives them full power to do, and what many of them have done on a smaller scale already, were they to exclude the millions of British people from their native islands. And such an exclusion, by which a few hundred thousand should at will banish thirty million people from their native country, while it would be more striking, would not be a whit more repugnant to natural right than the spectacle now presented, of the vast body of the British people being compelled to pay such enormous sums to a few of their number for the privilege of being permitted to live upon and use the land which they so fondly call their own; which is endeared to them by memories so tender and so glorious, and for which they are held in duty bound, if need be, to spill their blood and lay down their lives.

What this supposition describes has been realized, on a smaller scale, in actual fact. The territorial lords of Great Britain, whose land grants have given them the “white parasols and elephants mad with pride,” have over and over again driven the native population out of large districts. Their ancestors had lived on the land344 from time immemorial. They were driven off to emigrate, become paupers or starve. On uncultivated tracts in the new State of California you can see the blackened chimneys of homes from which settlers were driven by laws that ignore natural right. Great stretches of land that might be populous are desolate, because recognizing exclusive ownership has given one human creature the power to forbid his fellows to use it. The comparative handful of proprietors who own the surface of the British Islands could exclude the millions of British people from their native islands. They would be doing only what English law gives them full power to do, and what many of them have already done on a smaller scale. A few hundred thousand banishing thirty million people from their native country at will would be more striking, but not a whit more repugnant to natural right than what we see now. The vast body of the British people must pay enormous sums to a few of their number for the privilege of living on and using the land they so fondly call their own. Tender and glorious memories endear it to them, and they are bound in duty, if need be, to spill their blood and lay down their lives for it.

I refer only to the British Islands, because, land ownership being more concentrated there, they afford a more striking illustration of what private property in land necessarily involves. “To whomsoever the soil at any time belongs, to him belong the fruits of it,” is a truth that becomes more and more apparent as population becomes denser and invention and improvement add to productive power; but it is everywhere a truth—as much in our new States as in the British Islands or by the banks of the Indus.

I refer only to the British Islands because land ownership is more concentrated there, so they give a more striking illustration of what private property in land necessarily involves. “To whomsoever the soil at any time belongs, to him belong the fruits of it.” This truth grows more and more apparent as population becomes denser and invention and improvement add to productive power. But it is a truth everywhere, as much in our new States as in the British Islands or on the banks of the Indus.